“It was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair,” begins Charles Dickens’ The Tale of Two Cities. In 2011, the winter of despair was followed by the spring of uncertainty. Due to the earthquake/tsunami in Japan, the continued tribulations of Greece, rising commodity prices, and growing concern over the global economic recovery, volatility in the forex markets has risen, and investors are unclear as to how to proceed. For now at least, they are responding by dumping emerging market currencies.

As you can see from the chart above (which shows a cross-section of emerging market forex), most currencies peaked in the beginning of May and have since sold-off significantly. If not for the rally that started off the year, all emerging market currencies would probably be down for the year-to-date, and in fact many of them are anyway. Still, the returns for even the top performers are much less spectacular than in 2009 and 2010. Similarly, the MSCI Emerging Markets Stock Index is down 3.5% in the YTD, and the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) has risen 4.5% (which is reflects declining growth forecasts as much as perceptions of increasing creditworthiness).

There are a couple of factors that are driving this ebbing of sentiment. First of all, risk appetite is waning. Over the last couple months, every flareup in the eurozone debt crisis coincided with a sell-off in emerging markets. According to the Wall Street Journal, “Central and eastern European currencies that are seen as being most vulnerable to financial turmoil in the euro zone have underperformed.” Economies further afield, such as Turkey and Russia, have also experienced weakness in their respective currencies. Some analysts believe that because emerging economies are generally more fiscally sound than their fundamental counterparts, that they are inherently less risky. Unfortunately, while this proposition makes theoretical sense, you can be assured that a default by a member of the eurozone will trigger a mass exodus into safe havens – NOT into emerging markets.

While emerging market Asia and South America is somewhat insulated from eurozone fiscal problems. On the other hand, they remain vulnerable to an economic slowdown in China and to rising inflation. Emerging market central banks have avoided making significant interest rate hikes (hence, rising bond prices) – for fear of inviting further capital inflow and stoking currency appreciation – and the result has been rising price inflation. You can see from the chart above that the darkest areas (symbolizing higher inflation) are all located in emerging economic regions. While high inflation is not inherently problematic, it is not difficult to conceive of a downward spiral into hyperinflation. Again, a sudden bout of monetary instability would send investors rushing to the exits.

While most analysts (myself included) remain bullish on emerging markets over the long-term, many are laying off in the short-term. “RBC emerging market strategist Nick Chamie says his team has recommended ‘defensive posturing’ to clients since May 5 and isn’t recommending new bullish emerging currency bets right now….HSBC said Thursday that it isn’t recommending outright short positions on emerging market currencies to clients but suggested a more ‘cautious’ and selective approach in making currency bets.” This phenomenon will be exacerbated by the fact that market activity typically slows down in the summer chart above courtesy of Forex Magnates) as traders go on vacation. With less liquidity and an inability to constantly monitor one’s portfolio, traders will be loathe to take on risky positions.

In my previous update on emerging market currencies, I wrote that in the short-term, it’s important not to lump them all together; high-yielding currencies must be distinguished from low-yielding ones. In this post, I’m going to backpedal a bit and argue that over the medium-term and long-term, emerging market currencies as an asset class are still a good bet.

Most emerging market central banks have already begun to tighten monetary policy in order to mitigate against runaway inflation, overheating economies, and asset bubbles. You can see from the chart above (where a dark shade of green signifies a higher benchmark interest rate) that the overwhelming majority of high-yielding currencies belong to emerging market economies. (In fact, if not for Australia, it would be possible to say all high-yielding currencies).

While industrialized central banks are also expected to begin tightening, the timetable is much less certain, due to slowing growth, high unemployment, and low inflation. If current trends continue, then, interest rate differentials should only widen further between industrialized currencies and emerging currencies. Without taking risk into account, the most profitable carry trade will involve shorting the lowest-yielding currency against the highest-yielding currency(s). Alas, liquidity must also be taken in account, and the Angolan Kwanza – with an interest rate of 20% – is probably not a viable candidate. As one fund manager summarized, “[If] we feel like it’s a country where if we exit we are sort of going to shoot ourselves in the foot [due to lack of liquidity], then we won’t go in the first place.

Over the long-term, meanwhile, emerging market currencies will receive a boost from two related forces: strong fundamentals and capital inflows. With regard to the former, emerging market economies already account for the lion’s share of global GDP growth. The World Bank projects that over the next 15 years, emerging market economies will collectively expand by 4.7%, compared to 2.3% in the developed world. As a result of this strong growth, combined with fiscal prudence, debt levels across the developing world are generally falling. It marks a significant reversal that none of the current sovereign debt crises involves an emerging market country. What is more amazing is that some emerging market economies (Mexico, Russia, and Brazil) that struggled with bankruptcy less than a decade ago now have investment-grade credit ratings!

As a result, capital flows into emerging markets should continue to surge. Even though emerging market equity and bond funds have witnessed record inflows over the last few years, portfolio allocations still remain extremely low. For example, “U.S. defined-contribution pension plans only have 2.1% of their funds allocated to developing economies, which make up nearly 50% of global GDP.” Emerging market bonds, meanwhile, account for an estimated 1% of total assets under management. This trend will be further reinforced by domestic investors, which will probably opt to keep more capital in-country.

Of course, the risks are manifold. First of all, there is a risk that these capital inflows will provoke a backlash. “Emerging countries have adopted a broad range of measures to regulate inflows and stem currency rises, increasingly resorting to capital controls and so-called macro-prudential measures such as credit curbs.” Now that they have the blessing of the IMF, emerging market currencies might conceivably be more audacious in trying to limit currency appreciation. On a related note, there is also the possibility that emerging market central banks will fall behind the curve, perhaps deliberately. Lower-than-expected interest rates and hyperinflation would certainly dent the attractiveness of going long such currencies.

Finally, it is possible that in all of their excitement, investors are bidding up emerging market assets to bubble levels. The Wall Street Journal recently reported, for instance, that commodity prices and emerging market currency returns have become strongly correlated. Given that many of these countries are in fact net importers of energy and raw materials, this shows that emerging market currencies are rising more in proportion to risk appetite than to economic fundamentals. If when this risk appetite ebbs, then, this could send emerging market currencies crashing.

As you can see from the chart below, the world’s foreign exchange reserves (held by central banks) have undergone a veritable explosion over the last decade. While emerging markets (especially China!) have accounted for the majority of this growth, there are indications that this could soon change. China’s reserve accumulation is set to slow, while advanced economies’ reserves are set to increase.

In the past, central banks from advanced economies have accumulated reserves only sparingly, and in fact, much of this growth can be claimed by Japan. This is no mystery. While held by emerging economy central banks, most of the reserves are denominated in advanced economy currencies. This has ensured a plentiful supply of cheap capital, to support both economic expansion and perennial current account deficits (namely in the US!). In addition, advanced economy central bankers tend to hew towards economic orthodoxy, which precludes them from intervening in forex markets, and obviates the need to accumulate forex reserves. Emerging economies, on the other hand, depend principally on exports to drive growth. As a result, many are driven towards holding down their currencies in order to maintain competitiveness. China has taken this to an extreme, by exercising rigid control over the value of the Yuan, and necessitating the accumulation of $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.

This trend accelerated in 2010 with the inception of the so-called currency wars (which have not yet abated). Competing primarily with each other, emerging economies bought vast sums of foreign currency in order to promote economic recovery. Many countries from South America and Asia which don’t normally intervene were also drawn in. The result was a tremendous accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, which is reflected in the chart above.

There is already evidence that this phenomenon is starting to reverse itself. Consider first that advanced economies have participated in the currency wars as well. Japan’s reserves have swelled to more than $1.1 Trillion. Switzerland spent $200 Billion defending the Franc, and South Korea has spent more than $300 Billion over the last five years trying to hold down the Won. The Bank of England (BOE) recently announced plans to rebuild its reserves (the majority of which were redeployed towards gilt purchases). The European Central Bank (ECB) has announced similar plans, and may be joined by the Bank of Canada and US Federal Reserve Bank.

Advanced economies need currency reserves for a couple reasons. First of all, they can no longer rely on monetary easing to reduce their exchange rates because of the inflationary side-effects. Second, the recent coordinated intervention on Japan’s behalf showed that the G7 will move to protect its members when need be. Finally, political forces are compelling advanced economies to slow the outflow of jobs and production, and this requires more competitive exchange rates.

Emerging economies, meanwhile, are starting to recognize that unchecked reserve accumulation is neither sustainable nor desirable. First of all, managing those reserves can be tricky. Intervention is not free, and exchange rate and investment losses must be accounted for somewhere. Second, continued intervention has several detrimental byproducts, namely inflation and the handicapping of domestic industry. Finally, emerging economy currency appreciation is inevitable. Constant intervention merely forestalls the inevitable and invites unending speculation and inflows of hot-money.

There are a few of ways that currency investors can position themselves for this change. As emerging market economies stop the accumulation of (or worse, sell off) their reserves, a major source of demand for advanced economy currency will be curtailed. This will accelerate the broad-based appreciation of emerging market currencies against their advanced economy counterparts. At the same time, I’m not sure how much reshuffling we will say in the composition of reserves. The euro is plagued by existential uncertainty, while the yen and pound have serious fiscal problems. In the short-term, the Chinese Yuan is prevented by several factors from becoming a legitimate reserve currency, namely that it is too difficult to obtain. (As soon as this changes, you can bet that emerging economy central banks will begin accumulating it. After all, they are competing with China – not with the US). The dollar is certainly also an “ugly” currency, but given the size of the US economy, the depth of its capital markets, and the liquidity with which the dollar can be traded, it will remain the go-to choice for the immediate future.

In the short-term, traders that wish to short advanced economy currencies (namely the Japanese yen) can do so in the secure knowledge that they are backstopped by the G7 central banks. It’s like you have an automatic put option that limits downside losses. If the Yen falls, you win! If the yen rises, the BOJ & G7 should step in, and at least you won’t lose!

It was in November 2010 that I last blogged about the South Korean Won. As a result of the standoff with North Korea and a recent flareup in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the Won had plummeted. Still, I viewed these as temporary problems and concluded that, “Ultimately, both the EU fiscal crisis and the tensions with North Korea will subside, which should cause the Won to resume its rise.” Since then, the Won has indeed risen by more than 8% against the US dollar. Rather than call for a correction, however, I’m ignoring my best instincts and arguing in favor of a further rise.

In a nutshell, the Korean Won has almost everything going for it at the moment. In the words of one columnist, “South Korea is today the 15th largest global economic power [and] is also the leading global nation in shipbuilding, production of LCD screens and in the distribution of broadband per capita. It is the third leading nation in the production of semi-conductors, the fifth in automobile manufacturing and in scientific research.” GDP is growing at a healthy clip of 4.2%. After recording real GDP growth in excess of 6% in 2010, South Korea’s economy is projected to grow by a further 4.5% in 2011, which means that it has more than made up for the recession that it suffered alongside the rest of the word in 2008-2009.  Exports reached a record level in 2010, propelling Korea’s current account balance well into surplus. “It seems that a target of $1 trillion of trade this year will be achieved, in spite of unfavorable conditions from the massive quake in Japan and the Middle East unrest,” declared Korea’s commerce minister. On balance then, money coming into Korea well exceeds money flowing out.

Moreover, unlike Japan and China – both of whose currencies are hovering around record levels – the Korean Won remains about 20% below its 2008 pre-credit crisis high. That means that the Won has plenty of scope for further appreciation before its exporters will be squeezed to the same extent as its Asian competitors. If the Bank of Korea (BOK) has its way, it will be a long time before this even happens. The BOK continues to intervene on behalf of the Won on a daily basis, and as a result, its foreign exchange reserves have risen to $300 billion, a record high.

Granted, Korean inflation is also rising, and most recently touched 4.7%, which is at or above the level in neighboring economies. The Bank of Korea has taken steps to counter this, but it is understandably wary about inadvertently stoking speculative interest in the Won. Thus, it has raised its benchmark interest rate only four times since last summer, and the rate is still at a historically low level. According to the Wall Street Journal, “That’s still well below the 4% to 4.5% level where economists estimate the neutral policy rate to be.”

When you consider both that the carry trade is back in vogue and that most other emerging market currencies have recovered most of their credit crisis losses and then some, it’s downright surprising that the Won hasn’t risen more. Perhaps, lamented one commentator, South Korea still lacks cachet among investors and is known more as the political counterbalance to North Korea than as the economic juggernaut that it has become. Even though its economy is larger than that of Australia, the Won doesn’t have nearly as much appeal as the Aussie.

Since it’s the weekend, I’ll keep this post short and sweet! Suffice it to say that the Won still has plenty of scope for further appreciation, and unless the BOK completely avoids hiking rates, I don’t see real downside pressures. At this rate, it will probably be one of the big success stories of 2011.

A picture is truly worth a thousand words. [That probably means I should stop writing lengthy blog posts and instead stick to posting charts and other graphics, but that's a different story...] Take a look at the chart below, which shows a handful of emerging market (“EM”) currencies, all paired against the US dollar. At this time last year, you can see that all of the pairs were basically rising and falling in tandem. One year later, the disparity between the best and worst performers is already significant. In this post, I want to offer an explanation as to why this is the case, and what we can expect going forward.

In the immediate wake of the credit crisis, I think that investors were somewhat unwilling to make concentrated bets on specific market sectors and specific assets, as part of a new framework for managing risk. To the extent that they wanted exposure to emerging markets, then, they would achieve this through buying broad-based indexes and baskets of currencies. As a result of this indiscriminate investing, prices for emerging market stocks, bonds, currencies, and other assets all rose simultaneously, which rarely happens.

Around November of last year, that started to change. The currency wars were in full swing, inflation was rising, and there were doubts over whether EM central banks would have the stomach to tighten monetary policy, lest it increase the appreciation pressures on their respective currencies. EM stock and bond markets sputtered, and EM currencies dropped across the board. Shortly thereafter, I posted Emerging Market Currencies Still Have Room to Rise, and currencies resumed their upward march. It wasn’t until recently, however, that bond and stock prices followed suit.

What changed? In a nutshell, emerging market central banks have gotten serious about tackling inflation. That’s not to say that they raised interest rates and accepted currency appreciation as an inevitable byproduct. On the contrary, they have adopted so-called macroprudential measures (quickly becoming one of the buzzwords of 2011!), with the goal of heading off inflation without influencing broader economic growth. Most EM central banks have sought to achieve this by raising their required reserve ratios (see chart above), limiting the amount of money that banks can lend out. In this way, they sought to curtail access to credit and limit growth in the money supply without inviting a flood of yield-seeking investors from abroad. Other central banks have gone ahead and hiked interest rates (namely Brazil), but have used taxes and other types of capital controls to discourage speculators.

You can see from the chart of the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) below that EM bond markets have rallied, which is the opposite of what you would normally expect from a tightening of monetary policy. However, since EM central banks have thus far implemented tightening without directly influencing interest rates, bond yields haven’t risen as you might expect. In addition, whereas sovereign credit ratings are falling in the G7 as a result of weak fiscal and economic outlooks, ratings are actually being raised for the developing world. As a result, EM yields are falling, and the EMBI+ spread to US Treasury securities is currently under 3 percentage points.

The primary impetus for buying emerging markets continues to come from interest rate differentials. Given that interest rates remain low (on both an historical and inflation-adjusted basis), however, it’s unclear whether support for EM currencies will remain in place, or is even justified. Furthermore, I wonder if demand isn’t being driven more by dollar weakness than by EM strength. If you re-cast the chart above relative to the euro, the performance of EM currencies is much less impressive, and in some cases, negative. This trend is likely to continue, as Ben Bernanke’s recent press conference confirmed that the Fed isn’t really close to hiking interest rates.

Ultimately, the outlook for EM currencies is tied closely to the outlook for inflation. If raising the required reserve ratios is enough to head off inflation (and other forces, such as rising commodity prices, abate), then EM central banks can probably avoid raising interest rates. In that case, you can probably expect a correction in forex markets, which will be amplified by rate hikes in the G7. On the other hand, if inflation continues to rise, broad EM interest rate hikes will become necessary, and the floodgates will have been opened to carry traders.Either way, the gap between the high-yielding currencies and the low-yielding ones will continue to widen. In answering the question that I posed above, I expect that regardless of what happens, investors will only become more discriminate. EM central banks are diverging in their conduct of monetary policy, and it no longer makes sense to treat all EM currencies as one homogeneous unit.

A little more than two years ago, the Icelandic Kronur was one of the hottest currencies in the world. Thanks to a benchmark interest rate of 18%, the Kronur had particular appeal for carry traders, who worried not about the inherent risks of such a strategy. Shortly thereafter, the Kronur (as well as Iceland’s economy and banking sector) came crashing down, and many traders were wiped out. Now that a couple of years have passed, it’s probably worth reflecting on this turn of events.

At its peak, nominal GDP was a relatively modest $20 Billion, sandwiched between Nepal and Turkmenistan in the global GDP rankings. Its population is only 300,000, its current account has been mired in persistent deficit, and its Central Bank boasts a mere $8 Billion in foreign exchange reserves. That being the case, why did investors flock to Iceland and not Turkmenistan?

The short answer to that question is interest rates. As I said, Iceland’s benchmark interest rate exceeded 18% at its peak. There are plenty of countries that offered similarly high interest rates, but Iceland was somehow perceived as being more stable. While it didn’t apply to join the European Union (its application is still pending) until last year, Iceland has always benefited from its association with Europe in general, and Scandinavia in particular. Thanks to per capita GDP of $38,000 per person, its reputation as a stable, advanced economy was not unwarranted.

On the other hand, Iceland has always struggled with high inflation, which means its interest rates were never very high in real terms. In addition, the deregulation of its financial sector opened the door for its banks to take huge risks with deposits. Basically, depositors – many from outside the country – parked their savings in Icelandic banks, which turned around and invested the money in high-yield / high-risk ventures. When the credit crisis struck, its banks were quickly wiped out, and the government chose not to follow in the footsteps of other governments and bail them out.

Moreover, it doesn’t look like Iceland will regain its luster any time soon. Its economy has shrunk by 40% over the last two years, and one prominent economist has estimated that it will take 7-10 years for it to fully recover. Unemployment and inflation remain high even though interest rates have been cut to 4.25% – a record low. The Kronur has lost 50% of its value against the Dollar and the Euro, the stock market has been decimated, and the recent decision to not remunerate Dutch and British insurance companies that lost money in Iceland’s crash will only serve to further spook foreign investors. In short, while the Kronur will probably recover some of its value over the next few years (aided by the possibility of joining the Euro), it probably won’t find itself on the radar screens of carry traders anytime soon.

In hindsight, Iceland’s economy was an accident waiting to happen, and the global financial crisis only magnified the problem. With Iceland – as well as a dozen other currencies and securities – investors believed they had found the proverbial free lunch. After all, where else could you earn an 18% by putting money in a savings account? Never mind that inflation was just as high; with the Kronur rising, carry traders felt assured that they would make a tidy profit on any funds deposited in Iceland.

The collapse of the Kronur, however, has shown us that the carry trade is anything but risk-free. In fact, 18% is more than what lenders to Greece and Ireland can expect to earn, which means that it is ultimately a very risky investment. In this case, the 18% that was being paid to depositors were generated by making very risky investments. As the negotiations with the insurance companies have revealed, depositors had nothing protecting them from bank failure, which is ultimately what happened.
Now that the carry trade is making a comeback, it’s probably a good time to take a step back and re-assess the risks of such a strategy. Even if Iceland proves to be an extreme case – since most countries won’t let their banks fail – traders must still acknowledge the possibility of massive currency depreciation. In other words, even if the deposits themselves are guaranteed, there is an ever-present risk that converting that deposit back into one’s home currency will result in losses. That’s especially true for a currency that is as illiquid as the Kronur (so illiquid that it took me a while to even find a reliable quote!), and is susceptible to liquidity crunches and short squeezes.

When you enter into a carry trade, understand that a spike in volatility could wipe out all of your profits in one session. The only way to minimize your risk is to hedge your exposure.

At this point, it’s cliche to point to the so-called data deluge. While once there was too little data, now there is clearly too much, and that is no less true when it comes to data that is relevant to the forex markets. In theory, all data should be moving in the same direction. Or perhaps another way of expressing that idea would be to say that all data should tell a similar story, only from different angles. In reality, we know that’s not the case, and besides, one can usually engage in the reverse scientific method to find some data to support any hypothesis. If we are serious about finding the truth and not about proving a point, then, the question is: Which data should we be looking at?

I think the quarterly Bank of International Settlements (BIS) report is a good place to start. The report is not only a great-read for data junkies, but also represents a great snapshot of the current financial and economic state of the world. It’s all macro-level data, so there’s no question of topicality. (If anything, one could argue that the scope is too broad, since data is broken down no further than US, UK, EU, and Rest of World). The best part is that all of the raw data has already been organized and packaged, and the output is clearly presented and ready for interpretation.

Anyway, the stock market rally that began in 2010 has showed no signs of slowing down in 2011, with the US firmly leading the rest of the world. As is usually the case, this has corresponded with an outflow of cash from bond markets and a steady rise in long-term interest rates. However, emerging market equity and bond returns have started to flag, and as a result, the flow of capital into emerging markets has reversed after a record 2010. Without delving any deeper, the implication is clear: after 2+ years of weakness, developed world economies are now roaring back, while growth in emerging markets might be slowing.

Economic growth, combined with soaring commodities prices, is already producing inflation. (See my previous post for more on this subject). However, the markets expect that the ECB, BoE, and Fed (in that order) will all raise interest rates over the next two years. As a result, while investors expect inflation to rise over the next decade, they believe it will be contained by tighter monetary policy and moderate around 2-3% in industrialized countries.

The picture for emerging market economies is slightly less optimistic, however. If you accept the BIS’s use of China, India, and Brazil as representative of emerging markets as a whole, rising interest rates will help them avoid hyperinflation, but significant price inflation is still to be expected. I wonder then if the pickup in cross-border lending over this quarter won’t slow down due to expectations of diminishing real returns.

Any sudden optimism in the Dollar and Euro (and the Pound, to a lesser extent) must be tempered, however, by their serious fiscal problems and consequent volatility. As a result of the credit crisis (and pre-existing trends), government debt has risen substantially over the last three years, topping 100% of GDP for the US and 200% of GDP for Japan. Credit default swap rates (which represent the markets’ attempt to gauge the probability of default) have risen across the board. To date, gains have been highest for “fringe” countries, but regression analysis suggests that rates for pillar economies need to rise proportionately to account for the the bigger debt burden. According to a BIS analysis, US and UK banks are very exposed to Eurozone credit risk, which means a default by one of the PIGS would reverberate around the western world.

While I worry that such a basic analysis makes me appear shallow, I stand by this “20,000 foot” approach, with the caveat that it can only be used to make extremely general conclusions. (More specific conclusions naturally demand more specific data analysis!) They are that industrialized currencies (led by the Dollar and perhaps the Euro) might stage a comeback in 2011, due to stronger economic growth and higher interest rates. While GDP growth and interest rates will undoubtedly be higher in emerging markets, investors were extremely aggressive in pricing this in. An adjustment in theoretical models naturally demands a correction in actual emerging market exchange rates!

Over the last two years, the Brazilian Real has appreciated a whopping 37% against the US Dollar, second only to the South African Rand. It hasn’t been this strong since prior to the credit crisis, and it is rapidly closing in on a record high. If only Brazilian policymakers hadn’t made it a high priority to prevent that from happening.

The appreciation of the Real is being driven primarily by high interest rates, which in turn, are being driven by inflation. Brazilian prices are now rising at an annualized pace of 6%, which is well above the Bank of Brazil’s comfort zone. As a result, it has already raised rates several times in this cycle, including a 50 basis point hike at the beginning of this month. Its benchmark Selic rate now stands at a stratospheric 11.75%, which is higher than any other currency in the same tier.

Of course, the Bank of Brazil understands the implications of continuing to hike rates. With inflation as high as it is, however, it doesn’t really have much of a choice. Moreover, investors are betting on additional rate hikes, which means even wider interest rate differentials. When you also factor in a surprising lack of volatility surrounding the Real, it will certainly become an even more popular target currency for yield-hungry carry traders.

The government of Brazil, however, is doing everything in its power to repel this kind of speculation, lest it drive up the Real further and threaten the competitiveness of its export sector. In 2010, it tripled the tax rate on foreign investment in fixed income securities, to 6%. It increase scrutiny on local banks that have sought to borrow abroad. The national government has taken to doing more of its borrowing on the international market, and deposited the proceeds directly into its forex reserves, in order to mitigate the impact on the Real. The government is also contemplating punishing short-term investors by establishing a “lock-up” period for foreign capital.

And yet, Brazil finds itself in a quandary. While its trade balance has remained positive, its current account balance is now entrenched in deficit territory. Just like the US, it remaisn dependent on foreign investors to bridge this gap every month. Perennial budget deficits also mean the government can ill afford to alienate lenders. Finally, the government still wishes to attract legitimate foreign direct investment in infrastructure projects and portfolio investment in the stock market.

If Brazil is successful in limiting speculation – which is difficult, but not impossible given its determination – there is a chance that the Brazilian Real will hold steady. After all, Brazil saves less than it needs to invest, and inflation is high enough that there should be some natural downward pressure on the Real. On the other hand, if volatility remains low and speculators continue to find a way around the new capital controls (tempted by 11.75% short-term deposit rates), it will be difficult for the Central Bank to prevent its rise. It can only sit back, continue to hike rates, and pray that speculators soon lose interest.

Personally, I’m betting that the government of Brazil will achieve some measure of success, at least in the short-term. Of all the emerging-market countries engaged in the currency war, it seems to be the most resolute participant after China. At this point, short of fixing the Real to the Dollar, it has shown that it is willing to do whatever it takes to prevent speculators from winning.

I ended my previous post on the subject by noting that emerging market Central Banks were at a crossroads. Either they would raise interest rates and accept currency appreciation, or they would risk hyperinflation and economic instability. While the jury is still out on a handful of cases, it looks like most of the emerging market countries in Asia have chosen the former.

In February, the Bank of Indonesia raised its benchmark interest rate to 6.75%, from a record low of 6.5%. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has now hiked rates three times in the current tightening cycle. After a hike in January, the Bank of Korea inscrutably decided to hold rates in February, but signaled that another rate hike in March is likely. The Central Bank of The Philippines similarly indicated that it is ready to embark on a program of tightening. The same goes for the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). So far the main holdout is the Bank of Thailand, whose interest rates are still the lowest in Asia (ex-Japan) and remains reluctant to raise them too quickly.

Towards the end of January and the beginning of February, most Asian EM currencies sputtered in their appreciation. While there were a number of reasons for this (notably a pickup in risk aversion), Central Banks rejoiced in their perceived victory of foreign currency speculators. Unfortunately, there were a few downsides to this. First of all, capital outflow produced marked declines in Asian stock and bond markets, raising borrowing rates for everyone making it more difficult for domestic firms to raise capital. Meanwhile, inflation continued to rise, with no signs of slowing.

Thus, as I remarked the last time around, it was inevitable that (Asian) Central Banks would inevitably come to their senses. First of all, they realized that there was no free lunch, and that controlling their currencies would disable them from using traditional monetary policy tools to fight inflation. Second, while they could do without currency appreciation, they realized that this would have to be tolerated if they wanted to continue attracting foreign investment. (That’s because, as the Financial Times pointed out, currency appreciation probably accounts for half of all emerging market investment returns).

Third, it is inevitable that emerging market currencies will continue to rise over the long-term, in line with productivity gains. According to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, “countries with above average real income growth should have rising price levels, relative to other economies, and strengthening real exchange rates.” Based on this notion, emerging market currencies are forecast to rise by an average of 1.7% per year for the next 10 years.

Finally, in accordance with the unofficial rules of the currency war, emerging market countries are competing not with industrialized countries, but with each other. If all of their currencies rise in unison, export competitiveness is unaffected, inflation is tamed, and foreign capital remains abundant. It would seem to be a win/win/win.

In fact, it seems like investors are less interested in distinguishing between the different emerging market currencies of Asia, since at this point, all of them offer similar currency appreciation (over the last six months, returns have converged) and similar inflation-adjusted carry. Thus, it stands to reason that as Asian Central Banks continue to tighten interest rates, their currencies will continue to rise together.

By now, we’re all too familiar with both the so-called currency wars and its underlying cause – the inexorable appreciation of emerging market currencies. As more and more Central Banks enter the war in the form of forex intervention and capital controls, however, they are inadvertently stoking the fires of price inflation. They will all soon face a serious choice: either raise interest rates and cease trying to weaken their currencies or risk hyperinflation and concomitant economic instability.

This dilemma is fairly basic: a Central Bank cannot simultaneously control its currency and conduct an independent monetary policy. For example, if it seeks to adjust interest rates to serve domestic economic goals, it must understand that this will have unavoidable implications for demand for its currency, and vice versa. These days, that dilemma is becoming increasingly sharp. Inflation in many emerging markets is rising to dangerous levels, real interest rates or negative, and all the while, latent pressure continues to bubble under their currencies.

The problem is that investors have become so desperate for yield that they are willing to tolerate negative real interest rates in the short-term if they believe that interest rates and/or currencies will inevitably rise over the long-term. While capital controls have forced a modest decline in the carry trade, the expectation is that an inevitable tightening of monetary policy will soon make it viable once again.

Due to the ongoing (perception of) currency wars, emerging market Central Banks are trying to hold out for as long as possible, lest they make themselves into sudden targets for carry traders and currency speculators. Some have already bitten the bullet. Brazil, for example, raised its benchmark Selic rate to 11.25% recently and indicated additional rate hikes will follow. China has embarked on a similar path, but from a lower base. The majority of countries remain in firm denial, however. Last week, Turkey took the unbelievable step of lowering interest rates in a vain attempt to decrease pressure on the Lira.

Most Central Banks believe that they can enjoy the best of both worlds by cutting access to credit and raising banks’ reserve requirements (in order to combat inflation) and maintaining strict capital controls (in order to limit inflation). While they should be patted on the back for creativity, such Central Banks must understand that their efforts are probably doomed to fail over the long-term. That’s because currency investors understand that only a masochistic, short-sighted Central Bank would pursue a weak currency policy in spite of rising inflation for a sustained period of time. Unless economic growth slows (which is unlikely without certain policy measures) and/or inflation magically abates (due to steadying food/commodity prices, etc.), they will eventually have no choice to concede defeat. “Central banks view the level of exchange rates as the priority rather than using them to help slow inflation. Once you start targeting multiple objectives, the odds for policy mistakes increase,” summarized one strategist.

The only win/win solution involves a simultaneous appreciation of all emerging market currencies. This would alleviate some inflationary pressures without altering the competitive dynamics of national export sectors and negatively impacting economic growth. According to the Financial Times, “There could be a surprise agreement to rebalance currencies at the Group of 20 this spring, although the failure of its November summit does not augur well.” Besides, any agreement would probably be in the form of a reiteration of the status quo, in which emerging markets independently (rather than in concert) pursue similar economic policy objectives.

For better or worse, emerging market governments have started to refocus the blame for the currency wars away from the US and towards China. Regardless of whether the US is at fault for its quantitative easing program, emerging markets compete with China – and its allegedly undervalued currency – in matters of trade. Pressuring China to allow the Yuan to appreciate, then, would ultimately go a lot further in ending the currency war and eliminating their predicament than screaming at the Fed for flooding the world with Dollars. Due to a new President and shifting politics, Brazil is angling to force the issue.  Given that China is currently in the same boat (rising inflation with low interest rates), this might be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. “China may be more sensitive to what the other major emerging market countries think about its currency. It undermines their moral high ground when it’s Brazil criticizing them instead of the U.S,” observed one analyst.

In any event, barring some unforeseen crisis and a flare-up in risk aversion, emerging markets are expected to continue attracting outside capital (more than $1 Trillion in 2011 alone), and their currencies are expected to continue their steady, upward march.

A few years ago, I wouldn’t deign to discuss such obscure currencies as the Chilean Peso and the Peru New Sol. But this is a new era! These currencies – and their Central Banks – are being thrust into the spotlight as they join more established Latin American countries in the fight to contain currency appreciation.

Major Latin American currencies have collectively appreciated more than 29% since March 2009. (When researching this post, I discovered the fantastically apropos JP Morgan Latin American Currency Index, which is based on the currencies of Mexico, Columbia, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Chile, and is displayed in the chart above). That includes a nearly 45% gain in the Brazilian Real and a 30% rise in the Mexican Peso, with more modest gains by the Peru New Sol, Chilean Peso, and Colombian Peso. The Argentinean Peso seems to be dragging the entire index down, having never recovered from the sovereign debt default in 2008.

Over this period, capital has poured into Latin America: “Net private inflows surged to $203.4 billion last year from $57.5 billion in 2003, according to the World Bank. Stock market indices in the region are closing in on all-time highs, and bond prices have risen (i.e. 32% gain in Colombian bonds in 2010) to such an extent that spreads to Treasury Securities – the most common comparison – have narrowed to record lows. Perhaps this not for naught, as the region recorded economic growth of 5.7% in 2010 on the basis of rising commodities prices, aggressive/fiscal policies, and an overall global economic recovery.

Faced now with rising inflation (6% in Brazil, 4.5% in Chile, 11%+ in Argentina, etc.) and declining export competitiveness, Latin American countries have moved to stem the appreciation of their respective currencies. Brazil, whose finance minister coined the term ‘currency war’ and has been one of the most aggressive interveners in the forex markets, has been the most active. Its Central Bank continues to buy massive quantities of Dollars, it has raised taxes on capital controls, and most recently it moved to limit the ability of banks to short Dollars as a means of betting on the Real’s appreciation.

Meanwhile, “Chile, which hadn’t bought dollars in the foreign-exchange market since 2008, announced Jan. 3 it would purchase a record $12 billion, equal to 43 percent of the country’s currency reserves. In Colombia…the central bank is buying at least $20 million a day in the spot market. Peru purchased $9 billion last year, the second-biggest amount ever. While Mexico has so far refrained from intervention, it recently negotiated an IMF credit line which it could potentially tap for the purpose of holding down the Peso. All together, the Central Bank reserves of the six currencies mentioned above rose 16.5% in 2010 and now exceed $500 Billion.

It’s difficult to discern whether this intervention is having any impact. On the one hand, the raising of reserve requirements will certainly make it difficult for domestic banks to short their own currencies. In addition, some foreign speculators are getting spooked about all of the uncertainty and have moved to limit their exposure to Latin America. “There might be every macro reason in the world to love the Brazilian currency, but the randomness of policy to try and stop appreciation makes us want to have a smaller position,” explained one fund manager.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that legitimate institutional investors will also be scared away, which is problematic because Latin America remains reliant on foreign capital to fund its lavish fiscal spending and growing trade deficits. “There’s always a danger that by having capital controls, you can force some good capital to stay out of the country,” summarized one analyst. There are also concerns that Central Banks are losing sight of the bigger picture: “Central banks view the level of exchange rates as the priority rather than using them to help slow inflation.”

The problem, ultimately, is that Latin American countries want to have their cake and eat it too. The President of Colombia spoke recently of 5% GDP growth and the country’s desire to “put itself in the coming years among the most dynamic economies in the world,” but has whined about the upward pressure on the Peso. Brazil’s newly elected president has also spoken of becoming a global economic leader while its Finance Minister continues to sound off on the currency war. Meanwhile, Chile’s economy remains heavily tilted towards copper exports (it is apparently the world’s largest producer), and then wonders why rising prices have lifted the Chilean Peso. All blame the Fed’s Quantitative Easing Program for their currency woes and use China’s currency peg as basis for intervention.

In short, the appreciation of Latin American currencies has largely mirrored fundamentals. Individually and as a group, their exchange rates are still well below the bubble levels of 2008. Most of the rise over the last two years has merely offset the precipitous declines that took place during the height of the credit crisis. In addition, given the divergence in performance between individual currencies, it’s clear that investors (whether speculative or passive) are discerning. They have flooded the commodities producers with cash, while continuing to punish Mexico and Argentina over fiscal issues.

For that reason, there is reason to believe that most of the region’s currencies will continue to appreciate. Central Banks might manage to stall that appreciation in the short-term, but once they accept the inevitability of interest rate hikes (as Brazil already has) as the cure for inflation, the long-term upward path will be restored. Summarized one economist, “In these games of cat and mouse, I think policy makers will probably lose. There is too much unregulated capital in the world, particularly in developed countries. These guys will find ways around various restrictions.”

Emerging market assets/currencies registered some unbelievable gains in 2010 as the global economy emerged from recession and investor risk appetite picked up. In the last few months, however, emerging market currencies gave back some of their gains as the EU sovereign debt crisis flared up and the currency wars began to rage. Given that neither of these uncertainties is likely to be resolved anytime soon, 2011 could be a tumultuous year for emerging markets.

Let’s look at the numbers for emerging markets in 2010. The highlights for currencies were the Malaysian ringgit and Thai baht rose, both of which “rose around 10% against the dollar, to their strongest levels since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The South African rand was up 14% versus the dollar. It was a minor currency, however, that was the world’s best-performing: Mining-rich Mongolia’s togrog finished the year 15% higher against the dollar.” After being allowed to resume its appreciation, the Chinese Yuan rose by a modest 3.5%.

The J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global returned a record 11.9% in 2010, to the extent that now trades at a modest 2.5% spread over US Treasury bonds. The standout was probably Argentina, whose sovereign debt returned a whopping 35% over the year. Switching to equities, the MSCI Emerging Markets Index returned 16.4%, handily beating the MSCI World Index, which itself rose by an impressive 9.6%. The individual top performing stock markets in 2010 unsurprisingly were “Frontier markets such as Sri Lanka (+96.0%), Bangladesh (+83.5%), Estonia (+72.6%), Ukraine (+70.2%), the Philippines (+56.7%) and Lithuania (+56.5%).” In total, an estimated $825 Billion in private capital flowed into emerging markets during the year, including $53 Billion into local currency bonds.

Emerging markets took advantage of the surge in investor interest to issue record amount of local currency debt and through a plethora of massive stock IPOs. Still, the intractable rise in currency and asset prices was generally seen as an undesirable trend, and emerging markets took significant steps to counter it. More than a dozen central banks have already intervened directly in currency markets in a bid to hold down their currencies. According to the IMF, “Emerging nations had accumulated $1.2 trillion in currency reserves between the financial crisis’s peak in early 2009 and the third quarter of 2010,” including ~$300 Billion in Asia ex-China. Some countries, such as Brazil – poured $1 Billion a week into forex markets during the height of their intervention campaigns.

Speaking of Brazil, it was also among the first to impose capital controls, in the form of a 6% tax on foreign bond investors. Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia have also imposed capital controls, while Mexico has tapped an IMF credit line, which it can use to “manage the stability of its external balances.” Moreover, these countries collectively won an important victory at the fall meeting of the G20, by receiving formal permission for all of these measures.

Alas, most of these inflows were probably justified by fundamentals, which means that they are more difficult to fight against than if they were merely the product of speculation. For example, “Developing countries expanded at a 7.1 per cent rate, compared with 2.7 per cent in advanced countries.” Moreover, emerging market stocks are trading at an average P/E multiple of 14.5, well below their recent historical average. This means that in spite of impressive performance in 2010, corporate profits are still rising faster than share prices. In addition, yields on emerging market sovereign debt still exceed the yields on comparable debt for western countries, despite being lower risk in some ways.

While most of these trends are expected to persist in 2011, there is one overriding wild card. How emerging markets respond to this issue could determine whether emerging market currencies outperform again in 2011 or whether they sink back to more normal levels. Thanks to stimulative economic and fiscal policies, easy credit, and relatively loose monetary policies, emerging markets recorded phenomenal GDP growth in 2010. The downside has been inflation.

Inflation in Brazil and China, for example, officially exceeds 5%. (The actual rates are almost certainly higher). These countries, and a handful of others, are now in the awkward position of trying to control inflation without stimulating further currency appreciation. If they raise interest rates, economic growth and price growth will almost certainly moderate. By the same token,speculative hot money will probably continue to flow in. If they don’t tighten policy, however, inflation could easily spiral out of control, provoking economic stability and even social unrest. The upside is that real interest rates will turn negative, and their currencies will probably be depreciated by investors.

Most analysts expect emerging market central banks to gradually hike interest rates over the next couple years. For fear of stoking further speculation, however, policy will probably remain somewhat accommodative and will be accompanied by strict capital controls. Meanwhile, economic growth should begin to pick up in the industrialized world, accompanied by a similar tightening of monetary and fiscal policy. As a result, investors will be forced to decide whether risk-adjusted real returns in emerging markets are adequate, and if not, whether to reverse the flow of funds back into the industrialized word.

Despite all of the talk of currency war (a term first introduced by Brazili’s Finance Minister) and volatility in forex markets, the Brazilian Real is on pace to finish 2010 only slightly higher from where it began the year. While fundamentals would seem to support a further rise, Brazil’s government and Central Bank have made it clear that they will do everything in their combined power to prevent such an outcome. In short, the outlook for the Real in 2011 is incredibly uncertain.

There are two (somewhat contradictory) trends that have played a role in driving the Real to its current level. The first is the resurgence of the carry trade, whereby investors shift capital from low-risk, low-yield investments to higher-yield, higher-risk alternatives. With interest rates that are among the highest in the world – and certainly the highest among stable currencies – Brazil has been one of the prime recipients of carry trade funds. Since 2009, when concerns over the credit crisis began to ebb, the Real has risen a whopping 40%!

Moreover, the Central Bank might have no choice but to hike its benchmark Selic rate further over the next couple years. Inflation, at 5.5%, has already breached the Bank’s 4.5% target, and is projected to remain at an elevated level throughout 2011. According to futures prices, investors expect the bank to lift the Selic rate (currently at 10.75%) by 1.5% over the next twelve months, including a 50 basis point hike at its scheduled meeting in January. When you factor in low rates in the rest of the world, this would lift the yield spread between the Brazilian Real and most other comparable currencies to astronomical levels.

Alas, this first trend started to abate in the second half of 2010, due primarily to the EU sovereign debt crisis. Fortunately, the consequent move towards risk aversion hasn’t hurt the Real much. To be sure, Brazil is still an emerging-market economy, and is still perceived as being fraught with risk. However, when you consider that (certain) commodities prices (sugar, cotton) are at record highs and that the Brazilian economy barely dipped during the credit crisis, there are certainly riskier locales to park capital. Besides, many investors have determined that the interest rate premium that they receive from investing in Brazil is more than enough to compensate them for any added risk.

All else being equal, then, the Brazilian Real would probably continue rising at a measured pace in 2011. As I said, however, all else is not equal, since Brazil has pledged to do everything in their power to hold down the Real. According to the WSJ, “Earlier this year Brazil raised the IOF tax on foreign investment in fixed-income securities to 6% from 2% and also raised the tax for guarantees on derivatives investments.” Meanwhile, the Central Bank has intervened regularly in the spot market to purchase Dollars. The Bank’s newly appointed President, Alexandre Tombini, has voiced concerns over the Real’s rise: “We can’t let the economic policies of other countries determine the direction of foreign exchange.” On the day that he testified before the Senate’s Economic Affairs Committee, the Real fell by a substantial margin, suggesting that investors take his warnings seriously.

The Central Bank will also work closely with the new Brazilian administration to combat inflation, in a way that doesn’t cause the Real to appreciate. Rather than raise interest rates – which invites speculative capital inflows – the Bank will probably put pressure on the government to rein in spending and tighten access to credit. Over the long-term, this should allow it to lower rates to more sustainable levels, and prevent an expensive Rea from eroding the competitiveness of its export sector before it is too late.

Over the short-term, however, the immediate focus is to bring down inflation, most likely through rate hikes. That means that the Ministry of Finance will have to resort to more conventional weapons – such as taxes and intervention – to stem the Real’s rise. It managed to hold the Real to a 3% rise in 2010, but it remains to be seen whether it can repeat this feat in 2011.

In the midst of the currency war controversy, there is one emerging market country that continues to insist that its currency is undervalued: Russia. While being a member of the illustrious group of BRIC (Brazil / Russia / India / China) countries would seem to guarantee an appreciating currency, there are strong forces weighing on the Ruble. In other words, that it remains weak is not due to investor oversight.

If you view the performance of the Russian Ruble over the last few years, it’s clear that it never recovered from the rapid depreciation that took place during the height of the credit crisis. Given that nearly every other emerging market currency is either closing in on or has already breached its pre-credit crisis level, there must be something holding down the Ruble.

That something happens to be a sizable current account deficit. Unlike with other emerging markets, capital is actually flowing out of Russia. There are a few reasons for this: first of all, much of Russia’s debt is denominated in foreign currency, as a consequence of its massive default in 1998. Specifically, “The private sector has about $16 billion in foreign debt, including interest-rate payments, due this month [December], double the $8 billion of redemptions in October and November.” This means that every month, Russian companies must scramble to exchange Rubles for Dollars and Euros.

Next, the real returns of investing in Russia are currently negative. Russia’s Central Bank (Bank Rossii) continues to maintain the benchmark refinancing rate at a record-low 7.75%, and the 10-year yield on Russian bonds is even lower, at ~5%. This would seem to compare favorably with the 2.75% yield on comparable US Treasury Securities until you account for inflation, which is projected to top 8% for the year. While Ruble-denominated bonds pay a higher interest rate (7.75%), they also carry higher risk. For that reason, Russian yields and credit default swap spreads (which insure against default) are much higher in Russia than in other BRIC countries.

Meanwhile, Russian companies are taking advantage of low borrowing rates to engage in a reverse carry trade and invest in western countries: “Russian companies have announced $27 billion of foreign purchases this quarter, the most since the third quarter of 2008 and triple the amount in the last three-month period.” Finally, the reemergence of the EU fiscal crisis, combined with the skirmish in Korea has spurred a decrease in risk appetite. As one analyst summarized, “The whole of the emerging markets are on the back-foot at the moment and the ruble is no exception…it’s definitely risk off at the moment.”

As a result, Bank Rossii finds itself in a somewhat unique position among Central Banks of having to try to prop up its currency. Technically, the Rouble is pegged to a basket (consisting of 55% Dollars and 45% Euros), but pressure on it has been so intense that the range in which it is permitted to trade has been adjusted downward five times since the middle of October. To prevent it from declining further, Bank Rossii has been dipping into its $450 Billion stock of forex reserves, and selling foreign currency at the rate of $150 million per day. It insists that it will “allow” the Rouble to appreciate in 2011 in order to fight inflation, but that obviously depends on whether the current account shifts back to surplus.

What do investors think? According to a Bloomberg survey of currency analyst, “The Ruble will strengthen 4 percent versus the basket by the end of the first quarter of 2011. On the other hand, “Options traders are still bearish on the ruble with the currency’s one-week risk reversal rate — the premium of put options over calls — at 1.25 percent for the tenth straight day, from 0.5 percent at the end of October.” Non-deliverable forward contracts, meanwhile, reflect a weaker Ruble three months from now.

If the Bank Rosii fulfills analysts’ expectations and hikes rates in March, it will be step towards reinvigorating investor interest in Russia. More importantly, however, is that inflation is brought under control. Until that happens, the Ruble will remain the main standout in a sea of emerging market currencies that otherwise continues to outperform.

All things considered, Asian currencies have had an okay 2010 (and there’s still another month to go). After a modest first half, they started to rise in unison in June, and several are poised to finish the year 10% higher than where they began. While the last few weeks have seen a slight pullback, there is cause for cautious optimism in 2011.

At this point, I think the rise in Asian currencies has become somewhat self-fulfilling. Basically, investors expect Asian currencies to rise, and the consequent anticipatory capital inflows cause them to actually rise, thereby reinforcing investor sentiment. For example, the co-head of emerging markets for Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) is “investing in local currency debt and foreign exchange contracts in Asia on the basis that…emerging market currencies are bound to rise for…fundamental reasons.” Upon being asked to elaborate on such fundamentals, he answered lamely that, “One big driver for emerging markets in coming years will come from investors’ relatively low allocations to these fast-growing regions.”

When pressed for actual reasons, investors can glibly rattle off such strengths as high growth and low debt and wax bullish about the emerging market ‘story,’ but ultimately they are chasing yield, asset appreciation, and strengthening exchange rates. It doesn’t matter that P/E ratios for (Asian) emerging market stocks are significantly higher than in industrialized economies, or that bond prices are destined to decline as soon as (Asian) emerging market Central Banks begin lifting interest rates, or that Purchase Power Parity (PPP) already suggests that some of these currencies are already fairly valued. In a nutshell, they continue to pour money into Asia because that’s what everyone else seems to be doing.

Personally, I think that kind of mentality should inspire caution in even the most bullish of investors. It suggests that if bubbles haven’t already formed in emerging markets, they probably will soon, since there’s no way that GDP growth will be large enough to absorb the continuous inflow of capital. According to the Financial Times, “Data suggest that emerging market mutual funds, including those invested in Asian markets, have received about 10 per cent of their assets in additional flows over the past four to five months.” Meanwhile, a not-insignificant portion of the $600 Billion Fed QE2 program could find its way into Asia, exacerbating this trend.

In addition, emerging markets in general, and Asia in particular, have always been vulnerable to sudden capital outflow caused by flareups in risk aversion. For example, Asian currencies as a whole (see the US Dollar Asian Currency Index chart above) have declined 2% in the month of November alone, due to interest rate hikes in China and a re-emergence of the EU sovereign debt crisis. The former sparked fears of a worldwide economic slowdown, while the latter precipitated a decline in risk appetite.

As a bona fide fundamental analyst, it pains me to say that emerging market Asian currencies can expect some (modest) appreciation over the next year, barring any serious changes to the EU fiscal and global economic situations. It seems that capital will continue to pour into Asia, which – rather than fundamentals – will continue to dictate performance.

Emerging market economies must be whining about their currencies for a good reason. Why else would they spend billions intervening in forex markets and risk provoking a global trade war?

As it turns out, however, the rise in emerging market currencies has been greatly exaggerated. Over the last twelve months, the Brazilian Real is flat against the Dollar. The Korean Won has risen a mere 2%. The Indian Rupee has risen 4%, the Mexican Peso has appreciated 5%, and the standout of emerging markets – the Thai Baht – has notched a solid 10%. Impressive, but hardly enough to raise eyebrows, and barely keeping pace with the S&P 500. Not to mention that if you measure their returns against stronger currencies (i.e. not the Dollar) or on a trade-weighted basis, the performance of emerging market currencies in 2010 was actually pretty mediocre.

Perhaps that explains why so many analysts are still pretty bullish. Economic growth in emerging markets is showing no signs of abating: Standard Chartered Bank “expects emerging economies to account for 68 per cent of global growth by 2030 and forecasts China’s economy to expand at an annual average rate of 6.9 per cent over that period, even as the US and Europe grow at a much slower pace of 2.5 per cent.”

Stock prices (proxied by the MSCI Emerging Markets Index) and bond prices (proxied by the JP Morgan EMBI+ Index) are still rising. Moreover, as emerging market Central Banks (continue to) hike interest rates, returns on investment (and consequently, the attraction to investors) will rise further. In fact, if credit default swap spreads are any indication, the risk of default is perceived as being lowest in emerging market economies. That means that investors are being compensated for taking less risk with greater returns! It doesn’t hurt that – as Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke recently pointed out – investors are buoyed bu the belief that emerging market currencies will continue appreciating, providing an addition boost to returns.

It doesn’t look like the capital controls and other measures being adopted by emerging market economies will have a significant impact on slowing the inflow of foreign capital. Investors are already devising products to thwart the controls. So-called Global Bonds, for example, allow foreign investors to buy emerging market bonds without having to pay any special taxes, because they are settled in the home currency of the investor. Besides, investors with a long-term horizon can take solace that such taxes will become insignificant when allocated over a number of years.

There are, however, reasons to be cautious, In the short-term, bad news and flare-ups in risk aversion invariably hit emerging market assets hardest. Regardless of what information can be gleaned from credit default spreads, the majority of investors still associate the US with safety and emerging markets with volatility. That’s why when news of Ireland’s financial troubles broke, emerging market currencies fell across the board, and the Dollar rallied.

In addition, rising interest rates could cause bond prices to fall, and stock-market valuations may not be supported by fundamentals: “Emerging markets on average recorded economic growth of about 4 percent over the past few years while companies only recorded profit growth half of that. In China over the past decade economic growth was about 10 percent, while company earnings growth was only about 2 percent.” There is also evidence that investors and companies from emerging market countries are taking advantage of their strong currencies to invest and buy abroad, reversing the flow of capital.

Personally, I am slightly bullish with regard to emerging market currencies. The figures I quoted at the beginning of this post make it clear that we are not yet in bubble territory. In addition, even if fundamentals in emerging markets are not quite as strong as foreign investors would like to believe, they are certainly a lot stronger than in industrialized economies. Regardless of if/when the currency war is resolved, the short-term prospects for emerging market currencies remain bright.

Despite reaching a temporary stalemate, the currency war rages on, and individual countries continue to debate whether they should enter or watch their currencies continue to appreciate. Nowhere is that debate stronger than in New Zealand, whose Kiwi currency has fallen 37% against the US Dollar since its peak in early 2009, and over 15% since June of this year.

With most countries, the war cries are coming from the political establishment, who feel compelled to demonstrate to their constituents that they are diligently monitoring the currency war. This is largely the case in New Zealand, as Members of Parliament have argued forcefully in favor of intervention. Prime Minister John Key is a little more pragmatic: He “says his Government is concerned about the strength of our dollar, but is not convinced intervention would work…politicians who think intervention can happen without economic consequences, are fooling themselves.” Showing an astute understanding of economics, he pointed out that trying to limit the Kiwi’s appreciation would manifest itself in the form of higher inflation, higher interest rates, and/or reduced access to capital.

This is essentially the position of Alan Bollard, Governor of the Central Bank of New Zealand. He has insisted (correctly) that the New Zealand is being driven up, so much as its currency counterparts – namely the US Dollar – are being driven downward, by forces completely disconnected from New Zealand and way beyond its control. Thus, if New Zealand tried to intervene, it would quickly be overpowered (perhaps deliberately!) by speculators. Ultimately, it would end up spending lots of money in vain, and the Kiwi would continue to appreciate.

Mr. Bollard has pointed out that a stronger currency is not without its perks: such as lower (relative) prices for certain natural resources, such as oil. In addition, since New Zealand is largely a commodity economy, its producers are being compensated for an expensive currency in the form of higher prices for milk, wool, and other staple exports. While its other manufacturing operations have been punished by the expensive Kiwi, its economy is still relatively robust. Thanks to a series of tax cuts and the lowest interest rates in New Zealand history, GDP is forecast to return to trend in 2010 and 2011.

New Zealand’s concerns are understandable, and there is an argument to be made for preventing the Dollars that are printed from the Fed’s QE2 from being put to unproductive purposes in New Zealand. At the same time, New Zealand is not such an attractive target for speculators. Its benchmark interest rate, at 3%, is relatively low compared to developing countries. Its current account balance is projected to continue declining, perhaps down to -8%, which means that the net flow of capital is actually out of New Zealand. In addition, while the Kiwi has appreciated against the US Dollar, it has fallen mightily against the Australian Dollar en route to a multi-year low.

Going forward, there is reason to believe that the New Zealand Dollar will continue to appreciate against the US Dollar as a result of QE2 and a general sense of pessimism towards the US. The same is true with regard to currencies that actively intervene to prevent their currencies from appreciating. Still, I don’t think the New Zealand Dollar will reach parity – against any currency – anytime soon, and after the currency fracas subsides, it will probably trend towards its long-term average.

The Bank of Korea is one of the major participants in the ongoing global currency war, intervening on behalf of the Won to the tune of $1 Billion per day! Meanwhile, the Korean Won has risen 5% in the last month, and 10% over the last three months, the highest in Asia. What a disconnect!

First of all, what’s behind the Korean Won’s rise? In a word, everything. At the moment, things couldn’t be going any better for the Korea Won. The economy is booming. The current account / trade surplus is on pace to surpass forecasts. The Central Bank has hiked its benchmark interest rate once already to 2.25%, and will probably hike again this month. In addition. even though Korean indebtedness is rising, “It is ranked 99th among 129 nations in terms of the ratio of public debt to the gross domestic product (GDP), which means the country’s balance sheet is healthier than most other nations in the world.” Added another analyst, “In this period where there’s a lot of concern about debtor nations, countries that are considered to have higher credit scores will benefit.”

While the Korean stock market has surged (13% this ear and 50% last year), it still remains 25% below its 2007 peak and is trading at valuations well below other Asian countries. It’s no wonder that foreign investors have been net buyers of Korean stocks: “Foreigners have bought more Korean shares than they sold every day for four weeks and net purchases for the year amount to some $13 billion.” It doesn’t hurt investors that the currency is appreciating and that interest rates are rising; at the moment, there really isn’t much downside from investing in Korea.

Meanwhile, the US (Federal Reserve Bank) is contemplating an expansion of its quantitative easing program, and other Central Banks may follow suit. Under the (now fading) paradigm of risk aversion, concerns of economic decline in the industrialized world would have been accompanied by a sell-off in emerging markets and capital flight to safe havens. As evidenced by the spike in the Korean Won and other emerging market currencies, such is no longer the case.

Enter the Bank of Korea (BOK). It is widely known that the South Korean economy is highly dependent on exports, which could be negatively impacted by a rising currency: “For every one percent gain of the won against the U.S. dollar, the nation’s export and gross domestic product decreases by 0.05 percent and 0.07 percent each.” Moreover, South Korea competes directly with Japan, which means the KRW-JPY exchange rate is of crucial importance to the Bank of Korea. Of course, both currencies had been appreciating at a similar clip. Once the Bank of Japan intervened, however, the BOK had no choice bu to double-down on its own efforts.

The Bank of Korea seems to appreciate that there is only so much it can do. Intervention is not cheap, and its foreign exchange reserves have since surged to $290 Billion. It is also not very effective, and the Korean Won has continued to rise. Finally, the currency intervention contradicts the BOK’s efforts to contain rising prices. By not raising interest rates and trying to hold its currency down, it risks stoking inflation. What’s more – South Korea is actually hosting this week’s G20 summit, at which currency intervention is expected to be a major topic of discussion. It would be awkward, to say the least, if Korea’s own currency intervention was broached.

Thus, it seems the Korean Won is destined to keep rising. It, too, is well below its 2007 peak, and there is scope for further appreciation. The BOK will continue to make token attempts at halting its rise, but at this point, the forces that is fighting against – bullish investors and other Central Banks – are too great.

Brazil is beating the drumbeat of war. The forex variety, that is. According to the Finance Minister, “We’re in the midst of an international currency war, a general weakening of currency. This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.” By its own admission, Brazil will not be sitting on the sidelines of this war. Rather, it will do battle on behalf of its currency, the Real.

Brazil’s concerns are perhaps justified, since the Brazilian Real has surged to a 2-year high, and is amazingly not worth more than prior to the collapse of the Lehman Brothers and the ignition of the global financial crisis. (If anything, this shows just how far we’ve come in returning to stability). According to Goldman Sachs, the Real is now the most overvalued major currency in the world. This is confirmed by The Economist’s Big Mac Index, which shows that in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, Brazil is now the third most expensive country in the world, behind only Norway and Switzerland.

It’s not hard to understand why the Real is soaring. Its benchmark Selic rate is 10.75%, with government bonds yielding an even higher 12%. Even after controlling inflation, this is the highest among major currencies. Its economy is booming; GDP is projected at 10% in 2010. As a result, capital flow inflows have returned to pre-credit crisis levels: “Net foreign-exchange inflows totaled $11.14 billion in the September 1-17 period, up from $2.11 billion in the first 10 days of the month, according to data released Tuesday by the country’s central bank.” The inflows have been driven by a $70 Billion stock offering by PetroBras, the (formerly) state-owned oil company. It is a record sum, and over 3 times bigger than the eye-popping $23 Billion the Agricultural Bank of China raised only a few months ago. “If the Petrobras deal had never happened, the real might currently be trading somewhere around 1.75 per dollar,” compared to 1.70 today. With other companies rushing to follow suit with debt and equity offerings, cash will probably continue to pour in.

As I said at the beginning of this post, the Bank of Brazil has several tools up its sleeve. It has already resumed “surprise daily auctions to buy excess dollars in the spot market” (suspended in 2006), in which investors can trade Dollars for Brazilian government debt. It is also proposing reverse currency swaps, which would serve a similar purpose. ” ‘The order is to buy, buy and buy,’ ” said a government source. It has purchased nearly $1 Billion in foreign currency in the month of September alone, and has pledged to deploy its $10 Billion Sovereign investment fund if necessary. Finally, there is talk of raising the tax rate (currently 2%) on all foreign capital inflows, though there is no real timetable for such a move.

Alas, while the government of Brazil is certainly sincere in its intentions to hold down the Real, it lacks the wherewithal. Its $1 Billion intervention in September was dwarfed by the $20+ Billion spent by the Bank of Japan in one day to hold down the Yen. Even controlling for the difference in the size of their respective economies, Brazil has still been thoroughly outspent. Its $10 Billion investment fund pales in comparison to the ~$1 Trillion forex reserves of Japan. In short, Brazil would be wise to avoid full-fledged engagement in currency war.

Besides, the Real strength can better be seen in terms of weakness in the US Dollar and other G4 currencies. In this regard, Brazil’s measly purchases of US Dollars on the spot market probably won’t do much to counter the gradual exodus of cash from safe-havens back into growth currencies. Perhaps, it can take solace in the fact that the Real is so overvalued that it would seem to have no place to go but down.

Anyone who had bought emerging market currency(s) at the peak of the credit crisis in 2008 would have earned double digit annualized returns in the two years that have passed since then. There are only a handful of exceptions to this rule, and the most prominent one that I can think of is the Hungarian Forint. If you had bought the Hungarian Forint against the Swiss Franc (the base currency that most traders in the Forint look at, for reasons that I will explain below) in the fall of 2008, you would incur a loss of a 63% if you sold today. The Forint is down 11% in the last month alone. These are the kinds of numbers one might associates with mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps, not currencies!

So why is the Forint in the doghouse? Ironically, the answer is connected to mortgages. During the inflation of the housing bubble, Hungarians preferred to borrow in Swiss Francs, because interest rates were significantly lower than domestic Hungarian rates. This was not a mere trend; it was a full-blown phenomenon: “About 5.4 trillion forint($24.1 billion), or two-thirds of Hungary’s overall household credit, is denominated in foreign currencies. Of that, 82 percent is in Swiss francs, according to central bank data.” When the housing and credit markets were stable, noone bothered to examine currency risk. Given how much the Forint has fallen against the Franc, you can bet they are now.

As if the decline in housing prices wasn’t bad enough, consider that Hungarians that borrowed in Swiss Francs have now seen their mortgage payments/balances increase by more than 50%, depending on when they took out their loans. It goes without saying that even under the best of circumstances, it would be difficult to find the wherewithal – let alone the motivation – to repay such a loan. When you throw an economic recession into the mix, the prospects for repayment become even more bleak. As the Hungarian Forint has depreciated, loan defaults have risen, further stoking the Forint’s depreciation and loan defaults.

Alas, the Hungarian government’s program for solving this crisis is to punish the banks, both by allowing borrowers to delay repayment and by levying a massive tax – the highest on the EU – on all banks. While this might be helpful for bringing down the country’s budget deficit to the 3% mandated by the EU, it probably won’t do much for the economy. Speaking of the budget deficit, it has prompted S&P to warn of a possible cut in Hungary’s sovereign credit rating to junk-status.

Hungary’s cause hasn’t been helped by the breakdown of talks with the EU and IMF that would have supplied it with emergency funding. As if it wasn’t obvious from the Forint’s decline, investors are beginning to fear the worst and are slowly turning away from Hungary. The country’s benchmark stock market index has fallen 4% over the last six months. Meanwhile, foreign lenders are starting to balk at buying Hungarian debt without some kind of EU/IMF backstop, much like the one that was afforded to Greece: “Auction saleshave been a barometer of investor confidence in the country. On Sept. 2, Hungary sold 35 billion forint of 12-month Treasury bills, 15 billion forint less than planned, after receiving bids for 63.4 billion forint of the bills. Five days later, it sold 60 billion forint of three-month Treasury bills, 10 billion forint more than planned.”

At this point, all eyes are on the Hungarian government to simultaneously boost the economy and repair its budget deficit: “The rating agenciesare taking the same line as the markets and giving the government until local elections in October the benefit of the doubt, but if they don’t see then either a recommitment to the IMF program, or real concrete measures I think they move to cut the rating to junk.” If that were to happen, the self-fulfilling downward spiral in the Forint would probably continue unabated.

It makes you wonder: if the Greek Drachma were still around, how closely would it resemble the Forint?

The long wait is over! The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) has just released the results from its Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, conducted in April 2010. The report contains a veritable treasure trove of data, perhaps enough to keep analysts busy until the next report is released in 2013. [Chart below courtesy of WSJ].

First, the data confirmed earlier reports that average daily forex volume had surged to a record level in 2010: “Global foreign exchange market turnover was 20% higher in April 2010 than in April 2007, with average daily turnover of $4.0 trillion compared to $3.3 trillion. The increase was driven by the 48% growth in turnover of spot transactions, which represent 37% of foreign exchange market turnover. The increase in turnover of other foreign exchange instruments [consisting mainly of swaps and accounting for the majority of forex trading activity] was more modest at 7%.” In addition, for the first time, investors and financial institutions accounted for a larger share of turnover than banks, whose trading activity has remained roughly unchanged since 2004.

The composition of the turnover actually didn’t change from 2007, interrupting a shift which had been taking place over the previous 10 years. Specifically, the share of overall turnover accounted for by the so-called major currencies actually increased in 2010, from 172% to 175%. [Since there are two currencies in every transaction, total volume sums to 200%]. Growth in the G4 currencies (Dollar, Euro, Pound, Yen) was more modest, however, increasing from 154% to 155%. This reversal is probably attributable to the credit crisis, which drove (and in fact, continues to drive) investors out of emerging market currencies and back into safe haven currencies, namely the Dollar, Yen, and Pound. However, this theory is belied by the significant increase in Euro trading activity, which certainly hasn’t benefited from the recent trend towards risk aversion.

While emerging currencies as a group accounted for a smaller share of overall activity, certain individual currencies managed to increase their respective shares. The Singapore Dollar, Korean Won, New Turkish Lira, and Brazilian Real all fit into this category. Still other currencies, such as the Indonesian Rupiah and Malaysian Ringgit, also managed impressive gains but account for such a small share of volume as to be insignificant when looking at the overall the picture. Those who were expecting even bigger growth should remember that it’s ultimately a numbers game: the amount of Ringgit it outstanding is dwarfed by the number of Dollars, so any gains that the Ringgit can eke out are impressive. In addition, when you consider that the overall forex pie is also increasing, the nominal increase in volume for these small currencies was actually quite large.

The ongoing search for yield in all corners of the financial markets is likely to bring some of the more obscure currencies into the fold. “In June, I began getting questions about Uruguay, Vietnam and others,” said Win Thin, senior currency strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman in New York…investors often asked Mr. Thin questions about less-familiar currencies such as the Ukrainian hryvnia and Romanian leu.” In the same article, however, Mr. Thin cautioned that interest in such currencies is still probably lower than in 2007-2008, for a good reason. “It’s not like the Group of 10, or even the more liquid emerging market currencies where, if you decide you’ve made a mistake, you can get out.”

Due to the lack of liquidity and higher spreads, these obscure currencies aren’t really suitable for trading. Of course there will be a handful of institutional and even retail investors that want to make long-term bets on these currencies. They tend to be more aware of the risk and less sensitive to the higher cost and lower convenience. The overwhelming majority of traders, however, churn their portfolios daily, if not hundreds of times per day. A 10pip spread on the USD/MXN (Dollar/Mexican Peso) would be considered too high, let alone a 50 pip spread on any transaction involving the Ukrainian hryvnia.

In short, the majors will account for the majority of trading volume for the foreseeable future, regardless of what happens to the Euro. At the same time, that won’t prevent a handful of selected emerging currencies, such as the Chinese Yuan, Indian Rupee, Brazilian Real, and Russian Ruble from increasing their share. As liquidity rises and spreads decline, volume will increase, and their rising importance will become self-fulfilling.

The recovery that emerging markets (their economies and financial markets) have staged since the lows of 2008 is impressive. In most corners of the financial markets, all of the losses have been erased, and securities/currencies are trading only slightly below there pre-credit crisis levels. Even compared to twelve months ago, in 2009, the performance of emerging market currencies holds up well. In the year-to-date, however, most of these currencies have appreciated only slightly, thanks to a particularly weak month of August.

The MSCI emerging market stock index is currently down 2.5% since the start of the year. You can see from the chart above that most emerging market currencies tend to track this index pretty closely, rising and falling on the same days as the index. Interestingly, emerging market stocks appear to be much more volatile than emerging market currencies. You can also see that while the Malaysian RInggit has started to separate itself from the pack, the others have moved in lockstep with each other and are all about even for the year.

On the other hand, emerging market debt – as proxied by the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) has been unbelievably strong. Prior to the slight correction in the last couple weeks, the index has risen a whopping 20% over the last twelve months. On the surface, this disconnect between stocks and bonds would seem to be an anomaly, or even a contradiction. After all, if investors are only lukewarm about emerging market currencies and stocks, what reason would there be for them to get so excited about bonds.

If you drill a little deeper, however, it all starts to make sense. Due to a weak appetite for risk, 2010 has been a favorable year for bonds, at the expense of stocks. I would have assumed that poor risk appetite would also have helped G7 financial markets, at the expense of the emerging markets, but you can see from the chart below (which shows the MSCI emerging markets stock index closely tracking the S&P 500) that this simply isn’t the case. On the contrary, this same dynamic is playing out simultaneously in emerging markets. “Today, we are favoring emerging-market debt over emerging-market equities because the debt provides us with a better risk-adjusted return,” summarized one portfolio manager.

When it comes to debt, emerging markets have actually outperformed G7 debt, in spite of the current risk-averse climate. “Funds investing in emerging-market local-currency debt have attracted $16.9 billion of net inflows so far, more than triple the record annual intake of $5 billion recorded in 2007.” The logical basis for this shift is surprisingly straightforward: “When we look at government debt, we’re always comparing and contrasting the yields versus the fundamentals. I just don’t know why you would want those low yields from a Treasury bond in the developed world when you can get much higher yields — and in our estimation, an improving economic story — in Indonesia, Malaysia or Brazil.”

In other words, why would you want to earn 2.65% from a country (US) whose national debt is close to 100% of GDP, when you could earn double or triple that rate from investing in the sovereign debt of countries whose Debt-to-GDP ratios are sustainable?!  In addition, when it comes to investing in debt, the lack of volatility in emerging market currencies can bee seen as a plus, since it prevents the interest rates from becoming diluted. To be fair, fundamentals don’t represent the whole story: “After 2008, you really have to take liquidity into consideration. Emerging markets are going to be some of the first to freeze up in a crisis.”

In fact, some analysts are already starting to question whether the markets haven’t gotten ahead of themselves in this regard, and that perhaps we are due for a big correction: “Come September, when trading resumes in earnest, we’ll find out if the cozy emerging markets world we have experienced over the past few months was summer laziness or strong conviction.” With vacations ending and traders set to return to their desks, we won’t have to wait long to find out.

With the onset of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis this year, volatility levels in forex (as well as in other financial markets), surged to levels not seen since the height of the credit crisis. While volatility has subsided slightly over the last few months, it still remains above its average for the year, and significantly above levels of the last five years.

The spike in volatility was easy enough to understand. Basically, the possibility of a default by a member of the EU or even worse, a breakup of the Euro created massive uncertainty in the markets, spurring the flow of capital from regions and assets perceived as risky to those perceived as safe havens. As you can see from the chart below, this trend has begun to reverse itself, but still remains prone to sudden spikes.

While the crisis in the EU seems to have (temporarily) settled, investors are attuned to the possibility that it could flare up again at any moment. A failed bond issue, a higher-than-forecast budget deficit, political stalemate, labor strikes – all signal a failure to resolve the crisis, and would surely trigger a renewed upswing in volatility and sell-off in risky assets.

The same goes for (unforeseen) crises in other regions, affecting other currencies. Muses one analyst: “Next week? Who knows. One strong candidate is for flight out of the yen as investors start to fear there won’t be enough domestic demand for mountains of Japanese debt and foreign buyers will insist on much higher yields. Another might be that Swiss banking exposure to insolvent east European households causes another banking crisis.” Don’t forget about the UK and US, both of which have hardly put the recession behind them, and whose Trillions in debt represent powder kegs waiting to explode.

It will be months or years before these latent crises even begin to manifest themselves, let alone achieve some kind of resolution. As a result, many analysts predict that volatility will remain high for the foreseeable future: “Big and sudden currency market moves shouldn’t come as a surprise, whatever the direction…Higher market volatility should follow on from greater macroeconomic volatility. Increased economic fluctuations increase uncertainty. And there’s no question macroeconomic volatility has risen.”

In addition, there is no way for governments for Central Banks to alleviate these crises due to the “Trillema of International Finance.” Greg Mankiw, Harvard Economics Professors, explains that in prioritizing an independent monetary policy and open capital markets have forced many countries to forgo exchange rate stability: “Any American can easily invest abroad…and foreigners are free to buy stocks and bonds on domestic exchanges. Moreover, the Federal Reserve sets monetary policy to try to maintain full employment and price stability. But a result of this decision is volatility in the value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets.” While the Euro has eliminated exchange rate fluctuations between members of the Eurozone, meanwhile, there is nothing that the ECB can (or desires to) do to minimize volatility between the Euro and outside currencies.

From the standpoint of forex strategy, there are a couple of lessons that can be learned. First of all, the carry trade will remain underground until volatility returns to more attractive levels. Until then, the potential gains from earning a positive yield spread will be offset by the possibility of sudden, irascible currency depreciation. Second, growth currencies – despite boasting strong fundamentals – will remain vulnerable to sudden declines. That doesn’t mean that they should be avoided; rather, you should simply be aware that small corrections could easily turn into multi-month weakness.

After a slight respite following the culmination of the Eurozone debt crisis, emerging markets financial markets are back to the their former selves, with stocks, bonds, and currencies all performing well.

The rally is being driven by two principal factors. First, investors came to the gradual realization that the trend towards risk aversion had reached extreme proportions. Given that the crisis in the EU has been fairly limited both in scope and extent (at least so far), it made little sense to punish emerging markets. If anything, emerging markets should have been the financial safe havens: “Debt-to-GDP ratios in the developed world are about double those in emerging markets, and they’re growing. This makes emerging markets interesting because you’re picking up incremental spread and in return you’re actually taking less macroeconomic risk.”

Other analysts see a certain futility in targeting a risk-averse strategy: “It’s not that people suddenly think emerging markets are a lot safer, it’s that they’re realising risk is everywhere and they can’t just assume the developed world is safe.” In other words, some investors are wondering whether it doesn’t make sense to focus less on risk – which  has become increasingly random – and more on return. In this aspect, emerging market investments of all kinds are more attractive than their counterparts in the developed world.

The second source of momentum for the rally is a long-term shift in capital allocation. Thanks to foreign demand, Emerging Market “borrowers, including governments and companies, have raised almost $300bn (£200bn) to date, up 10 per cent on the same period in 2009.” A microcosm of this surge can be seen in US mutual funds: “Emerging market equity funds…posted combined inflows of more than $3 billion for the week ended July 14, while emerging market bond funds took in $745 million, bringing their year-to-date inflows to an all-time high of $18.5 billion.”

Across all sectors, money is pouring into emerging markets at an even faster pace than before the credit crisis. This time around, however, analysts argue that it is justified by fundamentals: “Economies in the developing world are slated to grow 6.3% this year and are expected to maintain a similar growth rate through 2013, according to the International Monetary Fund. Advanced economies are seen expanding around 2.4% annually over the same time period.” The Brazilian economy alone expanded at an annualized rate of 9% in 2010 Q1, the fastest rate in 15 years!

Emerging market investors share the confidence of foreign investors, and it seems the flow of funds will primarily be one-way. According to a recent survey, “Just 19 per cent of Brazilians, 15 per cent of Indians and 11 per cent of Chinese…said they anticipated increasing cross-border investment.”

At this point, the only thing that could derail emerging markets is if investors get too ahead of themselves. According to Citigroup, “Developing-nation shares will rally 20 percent to 25 percent by the end of this year as the world economy avoids a double-dip recession and attractive valuations lure investors.” That would bring share prices past the current level and dangerously close to the pre-credit crisis highs of 2008. The JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) has already shattered its previous record, and given the current spread of only 300 basis points to US Treasuries (which themselves are trading near all-time lows), one has to wonder if investors aren’t at risk of re-entering bubble territory.

If for whatever reason investors get spooked, it could spark the same capital flight that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, in which emerging market and commodity currencies alike fell 30-50% over a duration of mere months. While no one is predicting a similar outcome this time around, I think prudence and caution are nonetheless advisable.

It’s understandable that forex investors basically ignore New Zealand. Its economy is around 10% the size of its neighbor Australia, its currency is less liquid, and spreads are higher. Given that its performance closely tracks the Australian Dollar, meanwhile, why pay it any attention?

To be sure, the new currencies from Down Under trade in virtual lockstep, having strayed by only a few cents in either direction from their trading mean over the last year. Since the beginning of May, however, the Kiwi has staged an impressive rally, rising 8% against the Aussie in a matter of weeks. Perhaps, there is something worth analyzing after all!

According to most analysts, the sudden rise is largely a product of risk-appetite. Specifically, as the EU sovereign debt crisis stalls, investors are relaxing, and gradually moving capital back into growth currencies, like the New Zealand Dollar. In fact, the Kiwi recently rose to a one-month high on the same day that Spain successfully completed a bond auction.

For proof of this phenomenon, one need look no further than the close relationship between the NZD/USD rate and US stocks, as proxied by the S&P 500. You can see from the chart below that they have largely tracked each other over the last 12 months. This relationship seems to have intensified over the last few weeks, as the New Zealand Dollar sometimes takes its cues directly from releases of US economic data.

However, New Zealand economic fundamentals are also playing a role, perhaps even the dominant role. According to one analyst, “The NZ dollar had now recovered nearly all its losses of late May…Domestic fundamentals had contributed relatively more to the NZ dollar’s recent recovery than had the mild improvement in the global backdrop.” Unlike Australia, which has been racked by political disruptions and concerns over an economic slowdown by its largest trade partner (China), New Zealand continues to coast at a healthy pace.

Moody’s forecasts that New Zealand’s economy will expand by 2.4% in 2010, and “assuming a healthy global economy, New Zealand’s recovery should evolve into a self-sustaining expansion during 2011 and 2012.” This should set the stage for near-term rate hikes, beginning with an expected 25 basis point hike on July 29. Analysts project that the benchmark rate will reach 3.75% by the end of 2010, and 5% in 2011. Widening interest rate differentials, combined with the ongoing recovery in risk appetite, could turn the Kiwi into a popular carry trade currency.

Given that the Central Bank of Australia is also projected to further hike rates, it seems the Aussie will join the Kiwi in its upward march, and that the two currencies will continue to trade in lockstep. Options traders might try to construct a low volatility strategy, such as a short straddle or selling covered calls against the pair. For currency traders that prefer the Aussie, meanwhile, the New Zealand Dollar could serve as an attractive hedge.

Then again, it’s possible that both currencies could fade, especially if the EU debt crisis intensifies, and/or the global economic recovery stalls. In short, “The near-term outlook is…uncertain due to prevailing risk aversion that may weigh on the commodity currency universe.”

It looks like emerging market investors took my last post (“Investors” Shouldn’t Worry about the Euro) to heart, since emerging markets (EM) have continued to rally in spite of the Euro’s woes. To be sure, EM stocks, bonds, and currencies all dipped slightly in May when the crisis reached fever pitch, but they have since recovered their losses and are once again en route to record highs.

That’s not to say that that surge in risk-aversion wasn’t justified. In fact, investors are continuing to punish the Eurozone as well as a handful of other risky areas. However, analysts have concluded that in the case of emerging markets as a whole, this mindset doesn’t really make sense.

Simply, the fiscal and economic condition of is stronger than in developing countries. Whereas previously crises were known to originate in developing countries and spread to industrialized countries, this latest series of crisis turned that notion on its head. The credit and housing crises were largely the product of speculation in the West, and the sovereign debt crisis originated in Europe. While it’s possible that investor concern would self-fulfillingly cause the crisis to spread to emerging markets, any impact would probably be muted.

“There is recognition that emerging market balance sheets are strong and the debt to GDP ratio is below 40 per cent compared to the western world, where it is over 100 per cent in many countries,” summarized one analyst. “The vast majority of emerging market countries ‘have the tools to tackle inflation and will succeed, having reasonable independence from their central banks,’ ” added another.

Thus, the funds continue to pour in. “Net inflows into emerging market debt totalled $30.6bn (£20.7bn, €25bn) from the beginning of the year to late May compared with $33bn for the whole of 2009.” Here’s another sign of EM confidence: “IPOs in developing countries raised $29.3 billion this quarter, almost three times the amount in industrialised nations.” Meanwhile, the MSCI Emerging Market Stock Index has just finished its strongest rally since 2005, and the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) is closing in on another record high. This is frankly incredible when you consider that around half of the countries with the largest weightings in the index have experienced debt crises of varying severity over the last decade.

As far as forex investors are concerned, the confidence in EM capital markets should also extend to currencies. The carry trade is heating up (thanks to the cheap Euro), and will probably only expand as EM Central Banks move to raise interest rates to combat inflation, as alluded to above. If the Eurozone debt crisis intensifies, then you can expect some kind of pull-back. As with recent retracements, however, it will be only temporary.

The South Korean Won has been one of the biggest losers from the EU sovereign debt crisis. After a stellar 2009, the Won is off to a shaky start in 2010, and has lost 12% of its value in the last month alone. According to analysts, The won is “most sensitive to risk aversion” of any currency in Asia – or even the world. Thus, when the President of Hungary likened his country’s fiscal situation to that of Greece and inadvertently ignited fears that the crisis was spreading, the Korean Won immediately fell by 5% – the largest decline in 17 months.

Given all of the economies/currencies from which to choose, it seems bizarre that investors would gang up on the Won. That is, until you consider that South Korea’s fiscal situation is somewhat unique and that funding crises tend to hit the country especially hard. Summarized one analyst: “We are concerned that the negative market view of events in Europe will not dissipate and that the longer the stress continues, the more concerns will arise that the peripheral funding crisis could segue into a more extended funding crisis and into lower growth expectations.”

To elaborate, South Korea’s short-term foreign currency debt is extremely high (60% of foreign exchange reserves). That’s primarily due to Korean exporters’ hedging activities, which for risk management purposes, need to be offset by short-term borrowing by banks in the money market. Since this debt needs to be rolled over frequently, South Korea is especially vulnerable to liquidity crunches. In fact, the Won has been called a “VIX currency,” since it tends to fall when volatility (proxied by the VIX index) rises. Hence, the Won lost 50% of its value during the peak of the credit crisis, and has already declined 10% this time around.

The Central Bank is doing its part to relieve the liquidity shortage and stem the Won’s decline. It has already placed modest limits on speculative derivative transactions with the goal of limiting capital flight. It is pressing to renew currency swaps with the Fed and the Bank of Japan in order to increase the supply of alternative currency. In addition, it has taken to intervening directly in currency markets by selling Billions of Dollars on the spot market. Explaining the first market intervention in more than a year, the Central Bank declared, “The dollar’s surge against the won today was overdone. The authorities will try to prevent one-way currency moves.”

There are also a handful of market analysts who attribute the Won’s fall to the ongoing conflict with North Korea. In response to the sinking of a warship in March, South Korea has responded by imposing trade sanctions on North Korea, which in turn has responded with threats of “all-out war.” From a forex standpoint, “The largest concern is that the cutting off of economic links raises the risk of a sudden regime collapse, resulting in the South facing a huge influx of refugees. This would have a significant — and possibly prolonged — impact on the Korean won.”

How should one proceed? If indeed you believe that the Won is being harmed by the prospect of conflict with North Korea, you might be inclined to agree with the notion that, “The recent sell-off in the won has been overdone and should correct, assuming that the North-South tensions will ease in the months ahead.” In fact, if war is avoided, the current bear market could be an excellent buying opportunity, and the Won could still be on track to rise to 1,100 USD/KRW by year-end, conforming to analysts’ median expectations.

On the other hand, if you believe that the Won’s woes are largely attributable to the EU fiscal crisis, there is very little reason to hold the Won, since that crisis will probably only get worse before it gets better: “The Korean market was precariously positioned, with high multiples, above-trend earnings, heavy positioning towards risk and ominous technicals suggesting little sponsorship for strength.” In this case, the Won could easily fall to 1,300 – or worse – before the year is out.

In any event, South Korea will host a meeting of the G20 this week, which should yield more clarity into what the rest of 2010 has in store for the Won.

Generally speaking, investors are bullish about Brazil. The emerging market superstar emerged from the credit crisis essentially unscathed, and some believe that “Brazil will be the world’s fifth-biggest power by the next decade.” This year, the IMF is forecasting GDP growth of 5.5%, while the Central Bank of Brazil is projecting 6%.

But this post isn’t about the economy of Brazil. It’s about its currency, the Real. To put it mildly, investor sentiment surrounding the Real is slightly less rosy. The 30% appreciation (from trough to peak) against the Dollar has come to an end. “ ‘Buyers are exhausted. The real has been a pretty crowded trade and what’s happening is a lot of these long-term crowded positions are getting sold,’ ” summarized one money manager.

There are a handful of issues. First is the technical concern that the Real simply rose too far, too fast. “The currency’s weekly TD Sequential indicator suggests an almost yearlong rally against the dollar ended in October, while the moving average convergence/divergence, or MACD, chart shows the real is likely to weaken.  ‘A new trend has started and it’s strongly bearish.’ ” This notion is supported by an explosion in the so-called risk-reversal rate on the Real, in favor of options that give investors the right to sell. In fact, “insurance” on the Real is now the most expensive of any emerging market currency.

Investors are also nervous about the sovereign debt crisis in the EU, and are responding by temporarily moving funds back to safe haven currencies. “ ‘We’re seeing a lot of declines on top of concerns about Greece and Europe. Flows will come back to Brazil when you have signs of stability out there, and it doesn’t look like that will happen in the short term.’ ” Of course, this is also impacting the carry trade, as investors re-examine their models governing the trade-off between risk and return.

To be fair, increased risk could be accompanied by increased returns. Even withstanding a poor performance by the Real, itself, the benchmark Brazilian Selic rate stands at a healthy 9.5%. In all likelihood, it will be hiked past 10% next month, and to 11% by the end of the year. On the flipside, inflation is also surging (5.5% at last count). From the standpoint of investors, this is not really a concern, since there is no intention of using invested capital for consumption purposes. In fact, it could even be seen as positive, insofar as it will force the Central Bank of Brazil to continue to be aggressive in conducting monetary policy.

There seems to be a slight dichotomy between the data and the markets. On the one hand, there is plenty for investors to be excited about when looking at Brazil. On the other hand, the reality is that there just isn’t much excitement at the moment being channeled towards the Real. If interest rates continue to rise, and the debt crisis in Euro can achieve some kind of (stopgap) resolution, perhaps this will change.

Given that only a week has passed since the bailout of Greece was formally unveiled, it’s still too early to determine whether the plan will be success. Regardless of how it ultimately plays out, though, the bailout (not too mention the concomitant crisis) is shaping up to be THE big market mover of 2009. As investors reposition their chips, some early front-runners are emerging. It might surprise you that one such leader is the Japanese Yen.

On the surface, the Japanese Yen would seem to be an excellent candidate for shorting, especially in the context of the the Greek fiscal crisis. Its fiscal and economic fundamentals are abysmal, and by most measures, it’s debt position is among the least sustainable in the world, behind even Spain, Portugal, and the US. At the same time, the Yen has risen by an unbelievable 8% against the Euro in the last week alone, and many analysts are predicting it will emerge as one of the winners of this episode.

Why? First of all, with confidence in the Euro flagging, the Yen (and the Dollar) gain luster as the only viable reserve currencies. Regardless of what you think about Japan’s fiscal fundamentals, the longevity at the Yen means that it is inherently safer than the Euro, which may not even exist (in its current form, at least) in a few years time. Second, the current consensus is that the Euro bailout will fail, and as a result, risk tolerance is running low at the moment. With this in mind, it’s no surprise that traders are unwinding their carry trades and that the Yen – “The low-yielding currency of a deflation-prone economy of high savers…entrenched as the world’s funding currency” – has rallied.

Analysts have been quick to point out that the rest of Asia (among other regions) are on the other side of this trend. The concern is that the bailout won’t be enough to prevent a repeat credit crunch and that confidence in investments/currencies that are perceived as risky will remain low.

China could be hit especially hard. Since the Chinese Yuan is pegged to the Dollar (and even it wasn’t), it has risen by a whopping 15% against the EUro over the last six months, severely crimping exports to the EU. In addition, “Chinese exporters rely very heavily on bank letters of credit to finance their shipments…When banks have trouble borrowing money themselves — as has been happening as a result of worries about European banks’ possible losses from the region’s sovereign debt crisis — they tend to cut sharply the issuance of letters of credit for trade finance.” It’s no wonder that the Chinese stock market has tanked 21% so far in 2010, and that the Central Bank continues to delay revaluing the RMB.

Of course, if the plan turns out to be a success, than the opposite will probably obtain. “In this case…the currency of any emerging market or advanced economy exposed to the Asian region’s impressive, China-led economic growth,” will probably rally. “It could be the South Korean won, the Australian dollar, or the currencies of commodity-producing countries like Brazil.” The Japanese Yen, meanwhile, will probably be hit with a dose of reality, followed by a double dose of the carry trade.

The rally in emerging markets that I wrote about in April is showing no sign of abating. The MSCI emerging market stocks index is back to its pre-crisis level, while the EMBI+ emerging market bond index has surged to a record high. While no such index (that I know of) exists for emerging market currencies, one can be quite certain that at the very least, it too would also have returned to its pre-crisis level.

The Greek fiscal crisis, far from discouraging risk-averse investors from emerging markets, appears to instead be spurring them closer. From a comparative standpoint, emerging market governments are in much better shape than their industrialized counterparts, to say nothing of Greece. Credit ratings on a handful of emerging market debt issues are gradually being raised, whereas Greece was downgraded to junk status. Summarized one investor: “This is a group of countries with relatively strong balance sheets offering attractive levels of yield.”

It’s no wonder then that capital inflows into emerging market debt has already set an annual record (for 2010), despite the fact that we are only four months into the year! “The World Bank predicts as much as $800 billion in global capital flows this year, compared with about an annualized $450 billion to developing economies in the second half of 2009.” In addition, whereas institutional investors previously insisted on funding only those issues that were denominated in foreign currency (such as Dollars or Euros), now they seem to have a preference for so-called local currency debt. According to one emerging markets fund manager, “We expect local currency to be our biggest theme going forward.”

The real story here, however, is less the growing investor interest in emerging markets (which is now well established), and more the growing ambivalence of emerging markets. No doubt grateful to be attracting record sums of capital at lower-than-ever interest rates, emerging market governments are nonetheless unhappy about the resulting currency appreciation.

Taiwan has emerged as the unlikely voice of emerging markets on this issue. Its Central Bank recently “asked 65 banks for details of their foreign-currency lending to make sure exporters and importers aren’t using the loans to speculate on the island’s dollar,” and urged its peers to “adjust their monetary policies to address the disorderly movements of exchange rates.”

It doesn’t need to prod too hard, however, since a handful of Central Banks have either already intervened or are seriously considering intervention. Last month, Poland intervened by selling the Zloty against the Dollar. The Central Bank of South Africa cut interest rates by 50 basis points in March, despite surging inflation. Brazil continues to hold auctions to buy Dollars on the spot market, while India mulls implementing some form of a Tobin tax on currency transactions.

Not long ago, such measures would have been criticized as protectionist and against liberal, free-market principles. Not anymore. The International Monetary Funds (IMF), recently “urged developing nations to consider using taxes and regulation to moderate vast inflows of capital so they don’t produce asset bubbles and other financial calamities.” Private-sector economists agree, with Standard Chartered Bank arguing that “Emerging markets need to take ‘urgent action’ on the surge of liquidity and capital flowing into their economies because they could spur inflation and trigger another crisis,” much like “excess liquidity contributed to problems in the Western developed economies ahead of the financial crisis.”

In short, emerging markets have the green light to go ahead and stop their currencies from appreciating. But will they act on it?

As I pointed out in last Friday’s post (Volatility, Carry, Risk, and the Forex Markets), volatility has been declining in forex markets since peaking after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In fact, volatility among emerging market currencies has been falling particularly fast, and recently, something amazing happened: “Three-month implied volatility for the seven biggest developing country currencies fell to 10 percent in March compared with 11.4 percent for industrialized nations.” This inversion could rank as one of this year’s most important developments in terms of its impact on forex. The only runner-up that I can think of is Japanese LIBOR falling below American LIBOR.

Despite its remarkableness, this development isn’t unsurprising, since 8 of the 10 best performers in forex this year are emerging market currencies, led by the Costa Rican Colon, Mexican Peso, and Malaysian Ringgit. Still, we usually assume that with high return, comes high risk. How could it be that what are thought of as risky currencies are now less volatile than the so-called majors. Does it really make sense, for example, that the Turkish Lira is less volatile than the British Pound.

Without exploring this particular pair in detail, in a word, the answer is yes. In 2010, emerging market growth is projected to be higher than in the industrialized world. Inflation is relatively stable, and debt levels are comparatively low. Meanwhile, all of the G4 currencies (US Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, and British Pound) are plagued by the possibility of Double-Dip recessions and debt crises of varying seriousness. In sum, “Developing nations reduced their foreign debt to 26 percent of GDP last year from 41 percent in 1999, while advanced nations’ debt may surge to 106.7 percent of GDP this year from 78.2 percent in 2007.” Talk about heading in opposite directions!

Investors are taking notice. While the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) is now rising at annualized rate of 22% (implying a decline in emerging market bond yields), rates on comparable EU and US debt is rising. Last week, the 10-Year Treasury Rate topped 4% for the first time in 18 months (though it has since retreated). Meanwhile, credit default swaps are pricing in a .4% chance of default in the US. Granted, this is still infinitesimal, but anything above 0% would have been derided as ridiculous only a few years ago. This year, the US is projected to spend more on servicing its debt than any other country except for the UK. The projected $1.6 Trillion deficit for 2010 certainly won’t help things.

Thus, emerging markets are projected “to lure $722 billion in overseas investment this year, 66 percent more than in 2009…Developing-nation bond funds attracted $7 billion this year, pushing assets under management to a record $74.7 billion.” Many portfolio managers are betting that this will be a long-term trend: “The rally in emerging-markets has barely started yet.”

What are the forex implications? For the first time, we could see the G4 currencies start trading as a bloc. [Previously, it was the US Dollar versus everything else. The introduction of the Euro ten years ago only strengthened this trend, which is ironic considering the EU has also become an establishment currency. But, if you look at the charts, the Dollar/Euro pair has rarely traded sideways, and traders have used it as a basis for making broader claims about the markets]. Now, it looks like this could finally change: “The big trends will be in non-G4 currencies against G4, such as dollar/Norway or euro/Aussie, and in emerging market currencies.”

Upon reviewing my previous post on the Brazilian Real (BRL), I now realize that it lacked context. In other words, while both the interest rate outlook and economic prospects of Brazil are both incredibly bright, who’s to say that this hasn’t already been priced into the Real? At the very least, more information is needed to determine whether the Real is valued fairly on an historical and/or relative basis. [Alas, the focus of this post isn't on the Real specifically, but on the forex markets in general. Still, the concepts that will form the backbone of this post - volatility, risk, and carry - can be seen clearly through the prism of the Real.]

This doubt was sparked by an article that I read recently, entitled “Markets ‘Not Pricing’ Potential Risks,” which explored the idea that the renewed appetite for risk and consequent run-up in asset prices and re-allocation of capital is naively optimistic: ” ‘The unique environment we’re in now revolves around unprecedented level of government involvement in markets, which creates this complacency over risk because of this belief that governments will fix everything.’ Markets are under-pricing the risk that nations such as Dubai and Greece may default, and excess borrowing by others could lead to inflation.” From a financial standpoint, the practical implications of this idea is that the markets are underpricing risk.

In forex markets, complacency towards risk has manifested itself in the form of decreasing volatility. When you look at the 435 most commonly-traded currency pairs (actually most currency pairs involving the 35 most popular currencies), volatility is increasing for only nine of them. In addition, one month-volatility is now below 15% for all (widely-traded) currency pairs, which means that based on the most recent data, the highest, annualized standard deviation percentage change for every currency pair is only 15%. [It's difficult to translate that concept into plain-English, but the basic idea is that all currencies are (actually, only 68% of the time) currently fluctuating by less than 15% from the mean on an annualized basis. The idea of standard deviation is murky for non-mathematicians, so it's probably more useful to look at it on a relative and historical basis, rather than in absolute terms. In other words, the 15% figure can not be explained very well in an of itself; one must see how it compares to other currency pairs and to other time periods].

The fact that volatility is currently low suggests that the carry trade, for example, is set to become increasingly viable, especially when you factor in upcoming interest rate hikes. On the other hand, real interest rate differentials are currently modest (from a historical standpoint), and the concern is that rate hikes could be accompanied by rising volatility. The Brazilian Real, for example, “has a risk-adjusted carry of 45 percent, based on Morgan Stanley estimates, which means its carry rates had been better than current levels 55 percent of the time the last five years.” When you look at conditions from a few years ago, when volatility was at record low levels and interest rate differentials were larger than historically average, it’s obvious that the hey-day for the carry trade was in the past. It may come again in the future, but it certainly isn’t now.

From a practical standpoint, if you’re thinking about getting involved in the carry trade, you’ll want to choose a currency pair where the real (after adjusting for inflation) interest rate differential is high and volatility is low. You can cross-reference interest differentials with these charts – which uses recent mean return and volatility as the basis for forecasting confidence intervals – to get an idea about which pairs offer the best value (i.e. higher rate differentials at lower volatility). Just be aware that a sudden upswing in volatility could put a big dent in your risk-adjusted returns.

One of the main themes (even if not always overt) of my posts recently has been the revival of the carry trade, if not the already extant revival than at least the imminent one. In this context, there is no better candidate than the Brazilian Real.

After a stellar 2009, the Brazilian Real opened 2010 in much the same way that most emerging market currencies did: down. In the month of January, alone, it fell almost 10% against the Dollar, as fears of a widespread sovereign debt crisis took hold in currency markets. Its modest recovery since then, is not so much due to a decreased likelihood of such a debt crisis, but rather to a shift in the markets’ perspective away from long-term fiscal problems and back towards short-term economic and monetary conditions.

It is here where Brazil (and the Real) shines. As one analyst summarized, “The Brazilian economy has been transformed over the past few years. The boom-and-bust and hyperinflation of previous decades has been replaced by steady growth. The country was one of the last major economies into recession, but one of the first out.” 2009 Q4 GDP came in at 4.3% on a year-over-year basis, and is projected at 6% for 2010. Moreover, its economy is very well-balanced, and consumer debt levels are relatively low. Unlike in China, for example, infrastructure investment in Brazil still has plenty of room to grow, without crowding out private investment. This is important, given that the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics are right around the corner.

After rebounding from the lows of the 1999 currency crisis, meanwhile, the Brazilian stock market has had an incredible decade, returning an average of 20% annually. For the sake of comparison, consider that emerging markets have averaged 10%, and all stock markets have averaged only .2%. It doesn’t hurt that Brazil just discovered a huge (the fifth largest in the world) coastal oil reserve.

In fact, it might just be the latter that currency traders are most excited about: “Thus far this year, BRL is 68% correlated with crude oil prices…Last year the correlation was 53% and in 2008 the correlation was just shy of 32%.” This is the highest among any currency, even those that derive a much larger portion of GDP from oil exports, such as Canada and Norway. While there are almost certainly lurking variables in this correlation, a continued rise in the price of oil can’t hurt the Real.

Where does the carry trade fit into this? Look no further then Brazil’s benchmark interest rate of 8.5%. Impossibly, this represents a record low, despite the fact that this is nearly 8.5% higher than the current Federal Funds Rate. And the Brazilian rate is only set to rise. At the last meeting of the Bank of Brazil, 3 out of 8 Board members voted to hike the Selic rate by 50 basis points. The main opposition came from the Bank’s President, Henrique Meirelles, who steered a dovish course for political reasons.

Since then, inflation has continued to creep up and Mr. Meirelles has firmly renounced his political ambitions, and the stage is now set for a 75 basis point hike at the next meeting, to be held on April 28. Most analysts are projecting an “increase of between 200 and 300 basis points through mid-2011, [and] some investors are pricing about 450 basis points of hikes in the same period.”

It’s hard to predict if/when the Fed will follow suit, but most certainly won’t be to the same extent. As long as Brazilian interest rates can keep up with inflation, then, it looks like the Real will end 2010 in much the same fashion as 2009.

Since most emerging market economies and financial markets are fairly small, their currencies are subject to the whims of international investors, moreso than is the case with major currencies. For that reason, when I research emerging market currencies as a whole, I often like to focus on what investors are saying are saying about their stocks and bonds.

According to one columnist, “For an asset class once considered a snake pit of risk, emerging market sovereign bonds have become remarkably popular among investors. So popular, in fact, that even the most cautious of institutions have developed an appetite. Indeed, US pension funds are poised to pour almost $100bn (£65m, €74m) into emerging market debt in the next five years…potentially helping push yields relative to US Treasuries to a record low.” The popularity of emerging market debt is pretty incredible in the context of the Greek debt crisis and the consequent spike in risk aversion. At the same time, emerging market countries have been lauded for their sound finances and low debt-to-GDP ratios, so perhaps it’s no surprise that investors remain willing to continue lending them money. “More and more investors are looking to emerging market local bonds as an alternative to standard global bond allocations, as the problems in Greece and the European periphery highlight the credit risks of that market that have been long underpriced.”

The same is basically true for emerging market stocks, as “A recovery in economic growth and exports in developing nations is boosting the outlook for…company earnings.” Added another analyst, “When you look at the most recent financial crisis, one of the key features has been that emerging market countries weathered the storm extremely well.” Going forward, the consensus expectation is that emerging markets will soon account for the lion’s share of global growth.

For the most part, investors are still quite bullish on both stocks and bonds, despite – or perhaps because of – their amazing performances in 2009. The MSCI emerging market stock index has doubled over the past year, and the JP Morgan EMBI+ bond index rose 28% in 2009 en route to a record high. Still, there is concern that since emerging market stocks and bonds are basically in line with fundamentals, a further inflow of capital would push them into bubble territory. “Jerome Booth, head of research at Ashmore Investment Management, reckons that currency appreciation will be the main source of return for local emerging market debt portfolios in the medium term. ‘The only questions are when it starts and whether it happens fast or slow: with old world currency crashes or managed adjustment.’ ” This is problematic because it means at this point, investors may be chasing currency appreciation rather than direct asset appreciation.

Some investors have started to talk about bubbles, but these appear to be more regional in nature, and the handful of bears point to specific countries rather than dismiss emerging markets outright. For example, it’s now clear that there is a bubble in China’s property market, but not necessarily in the country’s stock market. The South African Rand, meanwhile appears to be overvalued, but the Central Bank of South Africa has announced that it will allow the Rand to continue appreciating. The Chilean Peso, meanwhile, is also poised to appreciate, ironically because of the recent earthquake, as Billions of Dollars aimed at relief efforts are already pouring into the country.

There’s much else that can be said about emerging market currencies at this point, and the near-term will depend largely on if/when/how the Greek debt crisis is resolved. While emerging market investors like to pretend that this is irrelevant, the fact is that they are still somewhat skittish, and even a minor crisis would send them running towards the exits.

By now, most investors are well aware of the acronym BRIC, which stands for the emerging market powerhouses of Brazil / Russia / India / China. When the idea was conceived in 2003, it seemed to make a lot of sense, as these four economies were at the top of the GDP ‘league tables,’ year-after-year. While China, India, and to a lesser-extent, Brazil, all continue to outperform, Russia has begun to lag. Perhaps Russia needs to be replaced as a member of BRIC. If the acronym is to be preserved, the only choices are Romania or Rwanda.

But seriously, last year Russia’s economy declined by 8%, compared to expansions of 6.5% and 8.3% in India and China, respectively. The Ruble fared equally poorly, relatively speaking. Compared to the Brazilian Real, which erased most of its 2008 decline, the Ruble’s rise offset less than half its previous losses. A similar picture can be painted with its. stock market. Not coincidentally, oil/gas prices have followed a similar pattern.

That the fortunes of Russia’s economy are too closely tied to energy exports is only half of the problem. The other half is as much cultural as structural. Russia’s economy is still largely oligarchical, and competition is lacking. Corruption is rampant, and the bureaucracy is out of control. In short, there is “a combination of corruption, poor governance, government interference in the private sector, and insufficient investment in the oil and gas sector,” which makes it unlikely that the Russian economy will embark on a stable course of development anytime soon. “What’s more, the warning signs of more economic trouble ahead are growing — for example, the increasing rate of non-performing loans on Russian banks’ balance sheets.” To put it bluntly, Russia’s economic prospects are somewhere between bleak and pathetic.

What about the Ruble, then? In the long-term, the Central Bank has pledged to shift its monetary policy away from micromanaging the Ruble. For the time being however, it remains focused on keeping the Ruble within a carefully prescribed range. Of course, it’s unclear whether the Central Bank sees its charge as defending the Ruble against a decline or against excessive depreciation, so currency traders shouldn’t read too much into it.

On the surface, the Ruble would seem to represent an excellent candidate for the carry trade. Despite being trimmed 10 times in 2009 alone, the Central Bank’s benchmark interest rate still stands at a healthy 8.75%. Moreover, the Central Bank has basically promised not to cut rates any further from the current record low. Remarkably, though, real interest rates are slightly negative, as Russia’s estimated inflation rate is 8.8%. Even more remarkably, this is the lowest level in decades! In other words, there is no interest too be earned from a Ruble carry trade, and the only upside is the appreciation in the Ruble.

And that ignores the downside risks, which are significant. After Russia defaulted on its debt in 1998, the international financial community basically lost confidence in the Ruble. Now, all of Russia’s government debt is denominated in foreign currency, mainly Dollars and Euros. Russian investors seem to harbor the same suspicions about their currency, and in 2008, the Ruble’s fall became self-fulfilling as investors transferred more than $150 Billion out of Russia, in the fourth quarter alone.

In short, I see very little upside from investing in the Ruble. There is no money to be earned from a Ruble carry trade. Betting on the Russian economy seems misguided. Betting on a continued rise in oil and gas prices would be better achieved by buying oil and gas futures directly. Meanwhile, any hiccup in the global economic recovery will certainly be met with an exodus of capital from Russia. Stick to the BIC countries instead.

In 2009, so-called commodity currencies – both individually and as a group – registered record-breaking gains. The Brazilian Real and the South African Rand finished up more than 30%, while the Australian and New Zealand Dollars finished up about 25% each, and the Canadian Dollar not far behind. While the outlook for 2010 is slightly less rosy (if only because of the law of averages), investors would still be wise to keep such currencies on their radar screen.

With the appreciations of 2009 canceling out the depreciations of 2008, currency markets are close to “equilibrium.” Going forward, then, investors will to find a rationale other than sheer momentum for making bets. Strong commodity prices represent one such rationale. This is not only the case because currency prices are rising and are underpinning the recoveries in the respective countries that are rich in their production, but also because economic recovery – and “normal” growth as well, for that matter – in many other economies is built precariously on debt and the expansion of sovereign money supplies.

Commodity currencies – and commodities in general – have always held allure as investment vehicles because of their tangibility and necessity. Simply, modern economies depend on commodities for their functioning. Thus, countries rich in natural resources would seem to represent safe bets, since they can be assured of demand both during periods of expansion and during economic downturns.  The strong performance of commodity currencies in 2009 underscores this point, since despite the fact that prices for many commodities are well below the record highs of 2008, these currencies are very close to their 2008 highs.

More specifically, the Canadian Dollar often tracks the price of oil; this correlation will probably only strengthen when the oil sands of western Canada are developed. While rich in many natural resources, it is gold that both Australia and South Africa are famous for, and to which their currencies are often tethered. Brazil and New Zealand deal in a more diverse array of commodities, and the Kiwi and Real often move in tandem with broad-based commodities indexes. There is also the Mexican Peso (oil), the Russian Ruble (natural gas), the Norwegian Krona (oil), and Chilean Peso (copper), but the correlations between these currencies and the respective commodities for which they are famous tend to be looser.

Of course, there are many other economies that are rich in natural resources, but for various reasons (lack of liquidity, fixed exchange rates), their currencies aren’t (as) appropriate for investing. Even the currencies I listed above don’t always reflect commodities prices. For example, Canada’s fiscal problems and South Africa’s monetary easing will arguably weigh down the Loonie and Rand, respectively, in 2010.

For commodity pure-plays, your best bet, then, would be to invest in the commodities themselves. Of course, commodities don’t pay interest and their costs associated with holding them (whether directly or indirectly) and they tend to fluctuate with greater volatility than currencies. Another option is the just-announced WisdomTree Commodity Currency Fund, an ETF composed of a basket of commodity currencies, many of which I listed above.

In October, I wrote about a “separation” that had taken place in currency markets between the “sick” currencies and the “healthy” currencies. At the time, I argued that the former category was comprised mainly of the Dollar and the Pound, with most other currencies healthy by comparison. While I still stand by this paradigm, I would like to revise it slightly. Specifically, I would like to add the Euro and the Yen to this list.

The recent blow-up surrounding the downgrade of Greece’s debt and subsequent explosion in the price of credit default swaps (which insure against default), have shined a spotlight on the fiscal problems of many of the EU’s member states, including Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and others. The situation in Japan, meanwhile, has been much more gradual, though equally dangerous: “In 1990, Japan’s total national debt load was 390% of GDP. Now it’s 460%. In the interim, the country has suffered sub-par growth and routine recessions.”

The fiscal problems of the US and UK governments as well as the debts of their citizens and companies have long been famous. For that reason, when the sick/healthy paradigm was first proposed, they were the two most obvious candidates. Having conducted some additional analysis, it’s now patently obvious that the same problems affect the EU and Japan. Given that their economies are also in weak shape, it doesn’t really make sense to group them in with the healthy currencies. Canada (and the Loonie, by extension) is also looking sickly, with its surging national debt and record budget deficits. The only reason it is being spared from the list is because of its richness in natural resources; in other words, it has something tangible that it can use to pay its debts.

Among the so-called majors, then, only the Swiss Franc, Canadian Loonie, Australian Dollar, and New Zealand Dollar get clean bills of health. A re-casting of the paradigm, then, would put the super-majors (Euro, Yen, Pound, and Dollar account for more than 75% of all foreign exchange activity) on one side, and virtually every other currency on the other. Given that national debt ratios and interest rate differentials diverge across the same boundary, it’s not hard to conjure a basis for this partition. “The IMF forecasts that gross government debt among advanced economies will continue to rise until 2014, reaching 114% of GDP, compared to just 35% for developing nations.” Adds another analyst: “If you look at currencies as a proxy for growth, then you can anticipate that emerging-market currencies will appreciate against the dollar.”

There is also a correction that is taking place within the group of sick currencies. Investors have come to realize belatedly that a Dollar sell-off doesn’t make any sense against the Euro and Yen, whose economic and fiscal situations could hardly be characterized as healthy. “Against the majors, we’re pretty close to the end, if we haven’t already reached the end of a bear market in the dollar,” asserted one analyst. Given that the Dollar’s demise had all but been taken for granted, this reconsideration isn’t coming natural. Volatility has surged to a 3-month high, and investors are responding by moving funds back to the US. Among the majors, then, it looks like the Dollar is still the “least worst” currency.

In 2009, the South African Rand was the world’s second best performing currency, after only the Brazilian Real. Since September, however, it has stagnated, and over the next year, it is projected to fall 10%. What happened?!

The Rand represents an interesting case study because it sits at the nexus of several trends. The first is the movement of funds into currencies with high interest rates. (The benchmark rate in South Africa is 7%). The second is the movement of funds into economies that are rich in natural resources. (South Africa is the world’s largest producer of platinum and the third largest producer of gold). The third is the movement of funds generally into emerging market economies. (South Africa’s economy was one of the world’s strongest [perhaps least weak is more apt] economies in 2009).

Thus, we should ask whether then Rand’s stagnation and projected decline is due to unique circumstances, or if instead it represents a reversal of one or more of these trends. Let’s start by looking specifically at South Africa. First of all, natural resource prices (gold and platinum) remain buoyant. Gold, as most of you are probably aware, is still hovering close to its (nominal) all-time high, while the price of platinum has resumed its upward trend, and is arguably closer to is all-time high than oil. In short, the pessimism can’t be explained by commodity prices.

How about interest rates? Well, South African rates are among the highest in the world. Despite a handful of cuts totaling 500 basis points over two years, the benchmark rate still stands at a healthy 7%, which is significantly higher than its counterparts in the developed world. Unfortunately, inflation in South Africa is also quite high (6%), which means real interest rates are closer to 1%. In addition, while Central Banks in other countries are contemplating raising rates, South Africa hasn’t ruled out cutting its benchmark further.

What about the fact that South Africa is considered to be one of the world’s vanguard emerging market economies? Well, this too, looks shaky. In contrast to the modest contraction in 2009 that made it a standout, 2010 may not be so kind. Analysts are expecting growth of only 2% in 2010, near the bottom of all economies, emerging market and industrialized. The US economy is projected to grow by 2.6%, in comparison.

With the exception of commodity prices (and perhaps the World Cup), there really isn’t much to be excited about when it comes to the South African Rand these days. For those looking for a growth play, South Africa isn’t it. For those employing a carry trade strategy, the Rand is also not an attractive candidate, since the positive interest rate spread it enjoys (small in real terms and shrinking) is hardly enough to compensate for the risk of currency depreciation. Those looking at Rand technicals (forgive me for not citing specifics here) must be worried that the Rand’s monumental surge in 2008 could only be followed by a correction. Not to mention the fact that various political factions in South Africa are calling for the Rand to be pegged to the Dollar at a rate 33% higher than current levels.

When you consider also that asset prices in emerging markets are now stalling, as investors fret about possible bubbles and contemplate bringing cash “home,” and also that the carry trade is slowly falling out of favor, it’s no wonder that analysts are gloomy about the Rand’s near-term prospects.

The Korean Won is up 32% since March, and 8.2% on the year. At the same time, it is 20% below is 2007 year-end level, as well as 13% weaker than the 2006 average of 955 and 15.5% weaker than the 2007 average.

Focusing only on the Won’s appreciation would probably cause some technical analysts to back off, while comparing it only to the highs of a couple years ago would lead others to pile in, without knowing examining other indicators. In my opinion, this is a situation in which technical analysis – because of the potential to send conflicting signals – falls short. Ergo, let’s turn to the fundamental picture.

The Korea Won has adhered closely to the overarching forex narrative. When the credit crisis struck, investors fled from Korea, and the Won lost 50% of its value practically overnight. With the return of risk-taking in the second quarter of 2009, however, the safe-haven appeal of the Dollar faded, and the Won rebounded strongly. With the potential end of the carry trade in sight, however, the Won has stuttered, and some analysts portend a decline in the near-term.

However, while many currencies will no doubt experience a correction if/when the Fed raises interest rates, the Korean Won probably won’t be one of them. Korean investments have certainly been buoyant of late, but not nearly to the same extent as in other emerging markets, where it could be argued speculative bubbles are now forming. In addition, Korean interest rates are hardly lofty; its benchmark rate is only 2%, hardly enough to justify a carry trade strategy in and of itself.

Instead, investors have been flocking to Korea for the economic fundamentals. Despite an appreciating currency, Korea’s trade surplus is on pace to hit a record $45 Billion this year, with a healthy $15-20 Billion forecast for 2010. In fact, the rising Won has has virtually no effect on exports, as Korean companies had prudently assumed that the Korean Won would be even more expensive (based on 2007 levels). In the automobile industry, for example, “New models being introduced now were designed and engineered two years ago to keep the company in the black even if the won strengthened to 900 to the dollar.” For that reason, analysts expect 2010 will be a banner year for the economy. After a modest expansion in 2009, GDP is projected to grow by 4.5-5% next year, the third highest among large economies, behind only China and India.

The Central Bank of Korea is also operating as though the Won will keep appreciating, irrespective of what happens to the carry trade. In one session last week, it intervened in forex markets to the tune of $500 million, with the goal of depressing the Won. With the recent expiration of a currency swap with the Fed, this is just as well, as Dollars could soon once again be in short supply. Korean monetary policy remains expansionary, but if the economy takes off in 2010 as expected, the Central Bank will have no choice but to raise rates and keep inflation within its target range.

In addition, there is now talk of turning the Korean Won into an international currency. ” ‘Korea has the opportunity to upgrade the won’s global status as a host country of the G20 2010 Summit.’ International use of the Korean won has been insignificant, although the nation’s share in international trade and finance has increased quickly,” analysts have observed. That the government of Korea is looking to promote the Won as a stable currency implies that it is comfortable with the prospect of further appreciation.

In short, the Won will probably be one of the standouts in 2010. Many currencies will suffer as changes in global monetary policy and the appearance of asset price bubbles cause investors to back off of the carry trade and exit certain emerging markets. South Korea won’t be one of them. With strong fundamentals and a growing profile, it’s no wonder that most analysts expect the Won to appreciate by another 10% in 2010.

Given that tomorrow is the first day of 2010, we won’t have to wait long to find out! On that note, happy new year!

Many analysts are pointing to Friday, December 4, as the day that logic returned to the forex markets. On that day, the scheduled release of US non-farm payrolls indicated a drop in the unemployment rate and shocked investors. This was noteworthy in and of itself (because it suggests that the recession is already fading), but also because of the way it was digested by investors; for the first time in perhaps over a year, positive news was accompanied by a rise in the Dollar. Perhaps the word explosion would be a more apt characterization, as the Dollar registered a 200 basis point increase against the Euro, and the best single session performance against the Yen since 1999.

Previously, the markets had been dominated by the unwinding of risk-aversion, whereby investors flocked back into risky assets that they had owned prior to the inception of the credit crisis. During that period, then, all positive economic news emanating from the US was interpreted to indicate a stabilizing of the global economy, and ironically spurred a steady decline in the value of the Dollar. On December 4, however, investors abandoned this line of thinking, and used the positive news as a basis for buying the Dollar and selling risky currencies/assets.

If you look at this another way, it reinforces the notion that investors are paying closer attention to the possibility of changes in interest rate differentials. The fact that the recession seems to have ended suggests that the Fed must now start to consider tightening monetary policy. This threatens the viability of the US carry trade – which has veritably dominated forex markets – because it literally increases the cost of borrowing (carry): “If the market thinks that Fed rates are about to move higher, the dollar will cease to be a funding currency and the inverse correlation between the dollar and risky assets will break.”

To be fair, it will probably be a while before the Fed hikes rates: “It’s a prerequisite to have a continuing decline in the unemployment rate for at least three months before the Fed considers tightening,” asserted one analyst. At the same time, investors must start thinking ahead, and can no longer afford to be so complacent about shorting the Dollar. As a result, emerging market currencies probably don’t have much more room to appreciate, since the advantage of holding them will become relatively less attractive as yield spreads narrow with comparable Dollar-denominated assets.

To be more specific, investors will have to separate risky assets into those whose risk profiles justifies further speculation with those whose risk profiles do not. For example, currencies that offer higher yield but also higher risk will face depressed interest from investors, whereas high yield/low risk currencies will naturally greater demand. You’re probably thinking ‘Well Duh!’ but frankly, this was neither obvious nor evident in forex markets for the last year, as investors poured cash indiscriminately into high-yield currencies, regardless of their risk profiles.

To be more specific still, currencies such as the Euro and Pound face a difficult road ahead of them (as does the US stock market, for that matter), mainly due to concerns over sovereign solvency. (Try saying that three times fast!) On the other hand, “Commodity-linked currencies such as the New Zealand, Australian and Canadian dollars [have] rallied sharply, and will probably continue to outperform as their economies strengthen and their respective Central Banks (further) hike interest rates.

It remains to be seen whether investors will remain logical in 2010, since part of the recent rally in the US Dollar is certainly connected to year-end portfolio re-balancing and profit-taking, and not exclusively tied to a definitive change in perceived Dollar fundamentals. Especially since they remain skittish about the possibility of a double-dip recession, investors could very easily slip back into their old mindsets. For now, at least, it looks like reason is in the front seat, making my job much less complicated.

While the Indian Rupee has risen more than 10%, since bottoming in March, it has increased only 4.3% in value in the year-to-date. Still, given how turbulent the first few months of 2009 were (a continuation of 2008, really), this modest appreciation was actually the third highest, among Asian currencies, behind only the Indonesian Rupiah and Korean Won.

For those of you that don’t regularly follow the Rupee (to be fair, I probably fall into this category), it has basically ebbed and flowed over the last couple years in accordance with risk appetite, hardly breaking ranks with other emerging market currencies. It rose to record highs in 2007, only to lose 30% of its value in 2008 as the credit crisis exploded. In 2009, as I pointed out above, it has staged a modest recovery, as investors have hungrily poured money back into emerging markets.

In fact, the benchmark Indian stock market index has risen 79% this year, its best performance since 1991. The bond market has also been performing well, thanks to a recent upgrade by Moody’s of the government’s sovereign local currency debt. “Moody’s said the move reflects ‘increasing evidence that the Indian economy has demonstrated its resilience to the global crisis and is expected to resume a high growth path with its underlying credit metrics relatively intact.’ ” As a result, foreign capital, some of which is bound to be speculative, is pouring into India. $100 million a day is being plowed into Indian stocks by foreign funds.

Analysts remain extremely optimistic about near-term prospects of India, partly because of its association with China (termed “Chindia.”) “India’s exports climbed in November for the first time in 14 months after sliding an average 21 percent since October 200…Overseas shipments rose 18 percent to $13.3 billion from a year earlier.” The result is blazing GDP growth, clocked at 7.9% in the recent quarter. Interest rates are already a healthy 3.25%, and can be expected to rise in the near-term as the economic recovery continues to cement itself.

Certain risks remain, namely that the government is spending money like there’s no tomorrow. It will borrow the equivalent of $100 Billion this year to finance a record budget deficit, equal to 6.8% of GDP. Compared to other economies, however, this is hardly remarkable, which is why India’s sovereign credit rating was upgraded despite the rising debt. “Moody’s said the government’s debt trajectory was stable and the government had high debt financing capability.”

Going forward, forex traders are relatively conservative in their forecasts for the Rupee, with consensus estimates for the currency to remain relatively flat during the course of the next year. This is surprising, given that it remains well off of its 2007 highs and thus, relatively cheap. Perhaps, its a sign that investors are nervous about the Indian government’s lack of a coherent long-term plan. Perhaps, it reflects uncertainty about bubbles that are forming in other corners of emerging markets. Probably, it shows that despite all of the progress that was made in 2009 towards containing the credit crisis, investors still remain vigilant, and are hedging their bets accordingly.

More about this next time.

Yesterday, emerging markets (proxied by the MSCI Emerging Markets Index) recorded their biggest fall since July, ending a week of solid gains. Still, this one-day slide of 1.4% pales in comparison to the nearly 100% gain that the index has achieved since bottoming last March. In other words, while investors might be starting to pull back, the direction of asset prices is still upward.

As for what’s causing this across-the-board appreciation, that was the subject of my previous post (Inverse Correlation between Dollar and Everything Else…Still), in which I merely stated the obvious; that the Fed’s year-long program of negative real interest rates and quantitative easing (i.e. wholesale money printing) has unleashed a flood of cash into global capital markets. Since we’re not just talking about the Dollar, here, it makes sense to point out that the Fed’s easy money policies have been copied by Central Banks in most other industrialized countries, including the UK, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, and to a lesser extent, the EU.

As for why emerging market assets and currencies seem to be outpacing appreciation in other asset classes, that’s also not difficult to explain. First of all, by some measures, emerging market stocks have hardly outperformed other assets. Oil, for example, has risen by 131% in less than a year, to say nothing of other commodities. Still, by other measures, growth has been remarkable. Most emerging market stock indexes and currencies have fully erased (or come close to erasing) the losses recorded during the peak of the credit crisis. Bonds, meanwhile, have gone one step further. Yields are collapsing, and prices have exploded – by 25% in the last year, sending the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index to a new record.

Is it safe to call this a bubble? Intuition would suggest so; given that all assets are rising across the board, without regard to particular fundamentals, it would seem that only a herd/bubble mentality could offer an explanation. Some analysts, in fact, have given up completely on fundamental analysis, instead using fund inflows (i.e. investor demand) to predict whether some emerging market assets will continue rising. As Nouriel Roubini (the NYU economist that famously predicted the credit crisis) summarizes: “Traders are borrowing at negative 20 per cent rates to invest on a highly leveraged basis on a mass of risky global assets that are rising in price due to excess liquidity and a massive carry trade.” P/E ratios are nearly twice as high in some emerging markets, compared to stocks in the S&P 500.

On the other side of the equation are the bulls and the efficient market theorists.”By historical price-to-earnings ratios — the ratio of stock prices to per-share profits — these levels can be justified, if the economic recovery continues. With massive layoffs, business costs have been cut sharply. “The hope is that when consumers and companies start spending, the added sales will drop quickly to the bottom line [profits].” Other proponents argue that the rise in asset prices is exactly what the Fed wants, since it implies that the markets are once again characterized by stability and liquidity.

Regardless of whether growth materializes, however, that doesn’t change the fact that the free ride can’t and won’t last forever. At some point, Central Banks will be forced to raise interest rates and start withdrawing Trillions of Dollars from global capital market. This will cause the Dollar to rise, and investors to rapidly unwind their carry trade positions. Warns Roubini, “A stampede will occur as closing long leveraged risky asset positions across all asset classes funded by dollar shorts triggers a co-ordinated collapse of all those risky assets – equities, commodities, emerging market asset classes and credit instruments.”

If the tech-bubble and real-estate bubble taught us anything, it is that there is no free lunch in the markets. It is not possible for all investors in all assets classes to simultaneously win. At least, in the long-term. In the short-term, meanwhile – it pains me to say this – let the party continue. My only warning is this: when the music stops, don’t be the one caught with your pants down…

On October 20, the executive office of the government of Brazil enacted an emergency measure, calling for a 2% tax on on all foreign capital inflows. And with one foul swoop, this year’s 35% rise in the Real had come to an end, right?

The tax certainly took investors by surprise, with the Brazilian stock market falling by 3% and the Real falling by 2%, the largest margins for both in several months. The tax is comprehensive and applies to essentially to all foreign capital deployed in Brazilian capital markets, whether fixed income, equities, or currencies. While the tax doesn’t apply to those currently invested in Brazil, the possibility that it would cause potential investors to stay away was enough to cause a sell-off.

The ostensible reason for the tax levy is to prevent a further rise in the Real. By most measures, the currency’s rise has been excessive, more than erasing the losses incurred during the credit crisis. The concern is that a more expensive currency will derail the Brazilian economic recovery before it has a chance to firmly get off the ground. “Brazil’s currency needs to weaken as much as 19 percent for sustainable economic growth, said Nelson Barbosa, the Brazilian Finance Ministry’s top policy adviser.”

According to cynics, however, the tax is a backhanded effort to raise revenue to fund a growing budget deficit. The government continues to spend money (perhaps to offset the negative impact on exports brought on by the Real’s rise) as part of its stimulus plan, but is increasingly tapping the bond markets to do so. The tax is expected to bring in an impressive $2.3 Billion over the next year, which could go part of the way towards fixing the government’s fiscal problems.

The real question, of course, is how the Real will fare going forward. The initial reaction, as I said, was ‘The Party’s over…‘ But investors with a longer-term horizon aren’t fretting. “In the medium term, the measure will have a limited impact. The fundamentals point to a stronger real, with commodities rising and the dollar weakening globally,” asserted one economist. While investors aren’t happy about paying an arbitrary 2% fee to the government, such pales in comparison to the 10%+ returns that investors still aim to reap from investing in Brazil over the long-term.

Ignoring the possible bubbles forming in Brazilian capital markets (admittedly, a dubious suggestion), Brazil still looks like a good bet, especially on a comparative basis. Interest rate futures point to a benchmark interest rate of 10.3% at this time next year, compared to ~1% in the US. Even after accounting for inflation and the 2% tax levy, the yield spread between Brazil and the US remains impressive. For that reason, the Real has already stalled in its expected fall against the US Dollar, standing only 1.7% below where it was on the day the tax was declared.

It’s unclear how determined the Brazilian government is towards pushing down the Real. The comments by its finance minister suggest that the consensus is that it is not slightly – but extremely overvalued. Thus, it’s likely that the government will enact other aggressive measures to prevent it at least from rising further. It continues to buy Dollars on the spot market, and is trying to make it easier for Brazilians to take money out of Brazil. It is not yet ready to tamper with its floating currency, but by its own admission, the “government was studying additional measures to regulate the heavy inflow of foreign investments and its impact on the country’s currency.”

There are also implications for other (emerging market) currencies. As I wrote earlier this week (“Central Banks Prop Up Dollar“) a number of Central Banks have already intervened or are currently mulling intervention in forex markets, to push down their currencies. You can be sure that other governments will be studying the situation in Brazil closely, with the possibility of implementing such policies themselves.

The Brazilian Real has been the world’s best-performing currency against the Dollar in the year-to-date, having risen 32% through the beginning of October. At this point, a mere 8% rise would send it crashing through the high that it touched last summer, prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

The currency has now firmly returned to pre-credit crisis levels, suggesting that investors have once again become complacent and/or they believe the worst of the recession is over. For now at least, the data appears to support that notion. After contracting for two consecutive quarters, Brazil’s economy grew at a healthy clip of 1.9% in the second quarter, compared to the previous quarter. “Brazil is the first Latin American country to emerge from recession—and one of the earliest among the G-20 countries to have done so—following a 1.9% quarter-on-quarter expansion in economic activity in the April-to-June period,” summarized The Economist. To put things in perspective, the economy still contracted on an annualized basis, but such is to be expected considering the depth of the recession. Accordingly, the economy is projected to remain flat for the year in 2009 before returning to consistent growth in 2010.

Some commentators have explained this in terms of “decoupling,” the pre-crisis theory that held the global economy (and certain emerging markets) were no longer dependent on the US to drive growth. While the simultaneous recessions in virtually every economy initially seemed to disprove that theory, the fact that some (Brazil, China, etc.) are recovering faster than others is causing analysts to once again asset its merit. However, a Google News search of “Brazilian Real” displays a preponderance of stories that connect the Real with the Dollar, so it seems the decoupling is still partial at best.

The fact that Brazil’s economy entered the recession late and emerged early can be attributed to an exceptionally well-balanced economy.  Exports account for only 13% of Brazilian economic output. In addition, commodities comprise the majority of exports, for which demand remains relatively strong. Compare this to China, which derives 40% of its GDP from exports of namely consumer and industrial goods. Domestic consumption has also remained strong, such that Brazil hasn’t had to promote fixed investment and subsidize growth with government spending.

As a result, the government’s fiscal position remains extremely strong. Its bonds remain investment-grade, which is a unique accomplishment in a region known for defaults, especially during recession. Despite the comparative lack of risk, Brazilian interest rates remain extremely high, even when adjusted for inflation. The benchmark Selic rate currently stands at 8.75%, and there is speculation that the Central Bank will follow the lead of Australia, another commodity rich country, and tighten soon. Interest rate futures currently reflect a 1.75% rise in rates by January 2011.

Investors have taken the hint and poured funds into Brazilian capital markets. Equities are surging, thanks to demand for shares in Santander, a recent IPO and one of the largest in Brazilian history. Brazilian bonds are also selling well and are often oversubscribed (when demand exceeds supply) by investors. Due to such strong fundamentals, meanwhile, the word “bubble” hasn’t featured too prominently in investor circles…yet. At the same time, currency futures are pricing in a gradual decline in the Real over the next year, implying that its run could soon come to an end.

In forex, timing is everything. If I had written this post a couple weeks ago, the headline would read “Euro Touches 2009 High.” Perhaps if I had waited another week, it would have read, “Euro Approaching 2009 High.” But alas, I chose today to write about the Euro, and the headline I chose is probably the most appropriate under the circumstances.

On August 5, “The euro hit a high for the year against the dollar as stocks trimmed their losses in afternoon trading Wednesday despite a generally cautious tone in currency markets.” Analysts were careful to point out that the markets remained cautious and the Euro eased past – rather than smashed through – its previous high. Technical analysts would and have argued that this paved the way for the subsequently rapid decline: “The euro is testing the base of an ascending channel with daily momentum charts showing a ‘double top in overbought territory.’ ”

This notion might have some merit, considering that fundamentals arguably favor a continued Euro appreciation. “The economy of the 27-country European Union shrank 0.3 percent in the three months ended June 30, for an annual rate of roughly 1.2 percent. The 16 countries that use the euro registered a 0.1 percent decline for the second quarter, or an annual rate of roughly 0.4 percent.” While output remains well below its 2008 levels, the slight contraction represents a tremendous improvement from the first quarter, when GDP shrank by 2.5%.

“Underlying the strong reading were solid performances in France and Germany, each of which grew 0.3 percent in the second quarter, government data showed.” This is helping to offset further contractions in Italy and Spain, which have turned into economic laggards as a result of the housing bust. In addition, exports in Germany grew by 7% last month, and “Investor sentiment improved more than analysts had expected in August to its best level since April 2006.” On an aggregate basis, “the euro zone’s trade balance with the rest of the world rose to 4.6 billion euros ($6.5 billion) in June, compared to a flat balance in the same month last year,”

Still, explorers looking for bad news and/or cracks beneath the surface will have no difficulty finding them. German exports (and output in general remain down year-over-year. In addition, there are still trouble spots in the EU, notably in western Europe. “Already, the euro area’s unemployment rate stands at 9.4 percent, its highest level in 10 years, and the anemic growth of the coming quarters will not be enough to arrest the slide. That, in turn, could drag down consumer confidence or even generate political backlash in Europe, economists said.” Most worrying is perhaps that, “consumer prices in the euro area dropped 0.6 percent in July…” ‘Deflation is becoming entrenched in the euro area, which would be very bad for the economy.’ ” Good thing the ECB left some room to lower rates further.

The Brazilian Real has been one of the world’s best performers in 2009, having risen by a solid 25%. The currency is now close to pre-credit crisis levels, and is even closing in on an 11-year high. When you consider that only six months ago, most analysts were painting doomsday scenarios and predicting currency devaluations and bond defaults for the entire continent, this is pretty incredible!

The currency’s rise has been supported by a variety of factors, few of which are grounded in fundamentals. To begin with, while Brazil has staved off depression, it’s not as if the economy is firmly back on solid footing. The economy contracted by 5% in the first quarter, and forecasts for 2009 GDP growth still vary widely, from a slight contraction to modest expansion. Meanwhile, the economy is importing more than it exports, despite the rebound in commodity prices. “The central bank said the net trade result was based on $9.89 billion in receipts for exports and $12.72 billion in import payments overseas.”

“Investment inflows, meanwhile, totaled $33.88 billion, while outflows totaled $29.78 billion.” The disparity between investment and trade data goes a long way towards explaining the Real’s rise. Thanks to a recovery in risk appetite, foreigners have poured cash into Brazil at an even faster rate than they once removed it. As a result, Brazil’s “Bovespa stock index has risen 51 percent this year, the world’s 12th-best performer among 89 measures tracked by Bloomberg, as foreign investors moved 13.7 billion reais into the market through July, the most since the exchange began tracking data in 1993. Brazilian local bonds returned 37 percent in dollar terms after falling 13.8 percent in 2008.” The country’s foreign exchange reserves also just set a new record, surging past the $200 Billion mark.

Brazilian interest rates tell the rest of the story. Despite a gradual decline over the last decade (made possible by a moderation in inflation), Brazil’s benchmark SELIC rate stands at a healthy 8.65%, which is the highest in South America, after Argentina. Unlike Argentina – and the dozen or so other economies around the world that boast equally lofty interest rates – Brazil is perceived as relatively safe place to invest. Given interest rate levels in the western world, combined with the expectation that Brazil’s currency will appreciate further, investors are more than happy to accept a little bit of risk in order to earn an out-sized return.

Just like the Bank of Korea, Bank of England (both profiled by the Forex Blog in the last week), the Bank of Brazil is not happy with the resilience in its currency. “Brazil’s central bank said on Wednesday it bought $779 million on the spot foreign exchange market this month to Aug. 7 as dollar inflows to the country surged because of growing demand for local stocks and bonds.” This brings the total intervention expenditure to $9 Billion.

Unfortunately for the Bank of Brazil, the forces in the forex market are way beyond its control. “Dollar inflows to the country totaled $2.26 billion this month to Aug. 7, compared with inflows of $1.27 billion in all of July.” Analysts are also unconvinced, and are racing to revise their Real forecasts upward. One economist, caught completely off guard, just “changed his year-end real forecast to 1.8 from 2.5 at the start of the year. ‘The resilience of the Brazilian economy to weather this crisis has been spectacular,’ ” he explained.

Last year the Korean Won was one of the world’s weakest currencies- and that’s saying a lot when you you consider how many currencies tanked at the onset of the credit crisis. The Won lost nearly half of its value, driven by concerns that Korean creditors would be unable to pay their foreign debts. Since March, however, the currency has rebounded by an impressive 25%, as the government took action: “To avert a crisis, South Korea forged a dollar-swap agreement with the U.S., pumped money into the banking system, boosted fiscal spending, set up funds to replenish bank capital and cut rates.”

In the last quarter, South Korea’s economy grew 2.3%, the fastest pace in nearly six years, marking a significant turnaround from the 5% contraction recorded in the fourth quarter of 2008. Still, “South Korea’s economy will shrink 1.8 percent this year, the IMF said yesterday, revising a July prediction for a 3 percent contraction.” Exports, which account for 50% of GDP, have also recovered, and are now rising by nearly 20% on an annualized basis. Retail sales are climbing, and bank lending to households has risen for six straight months. Finally, “Stimulus measures at home and abroad are fueling South Korea’s revival. The government has pledged more than 67 trillion won ($53 billion) in extra spending, helping consumer confidence climb to the highest in almost two years in June.”

However, an inflow of speculative hot money – which has buttressed a rally in Korean stocks – threatens to undo the recovery. “With an anticipated increase in risk appetite, foreign investors may invest further in emerging-market equities, leading to more dollar supply,” said one analyst. The first half 2009 current account surplus set a record, with forecasts for the second half not far behind. Korea’s foreign exchange reserves, meanwhile, have recovered, and could touch $300 Billion within the next year.

Of course, the Central bank is not simply standing by idly. It has already lowered its benchmark rate to a record low 2%, and at yesterday’s monthly monetary policy meeting, it firmly refused to consider raising it for at least six months. Commented one analyst, “There is no urgent need to raise rates. The most likely course of action is that the Bank of Korea will wait until the economy fully recovers, and in particular, they will wait until the unemployment rate stops increasing.” Still, given both that interest rates remain above levels in the west (see chart below) and that the Korean Won is considered undervalued, funds could continue to flow in.

The Central Bank’s other tool is direct intervention in the forex markets, in order to depress the strengthening Won. But this, it is loathe to do: ” ‘It would be better to have a larger foreign exchange reserve in order to better deal with economic crises, but attempts to buy dollars to artificially boost the reserve volume could lead to accusations of currency manipulation, while excess won in the markets could stoke inflation,’ a high-ranking ministry official said.” Still, investors are growing increasingly nervous about this possibility:”A state-run bank that usually doesn’t participate much in the market bought some dollars at the day’s low, prompting speculation about a possible intervention, a local bank trader said.” Sure enough, after hitting the psychologically important level of 1,220 at the end of July, the Won dived. It has yet to bounce back.

Over the last year, Israel has quietly amassed one of the world’s largest repositories of foreign exchange reserves. On average, the Central Bank of Israel has purchased $100 million worth of Dollars every day since July 2008, bringing its total reserves to $52 Billion. The Bank’s goals are twofold: to sterilize the inflow of speculative money pouring into Israel in order to mitigate inflation, and to stem the appreciation of the Shekel.

Towards this latter, the Bank received a boost by the credit crisis, which caused an outbreak of risk aversion and sent investors rushing to shift funds into so-called safe haven countries/currencies. As a result, the Israeli stock market tanked, and the Shekel plummeted 30% in a matter of months.

Thanks to the recent upswing in risk appetite, however, the Shekel has bounced back, having risen 10% since April. While the Shekel still remains well off its its 2008 highs, the sudden rise still elicited the attention of the Bank of Israel, which announced that it would respond to the, “Unusual movements in the exchange rate that are inconsistent with underlying economic conditions, or when conditions in the foreign exchange market are disorderly,” by intervening heavily in the open market. It “is believed to have purchased between $1.5-1.7 billion this week so far.”

The Bank has also taken steps to inadvertently degrade its currency by lowering its benchmark interest rate to .5%, and buying bonds on the open market. “The central bank will have bought a total of 18 billion shekels ($4.7 billion) of bonds when it completes the program….The bank said in its statement that it does not intend to sell the securities it purchased and will continue buying foreign currency.” While its unclear whether the program has succeeded in stimulating the economy – which contracted by 3.7% last quarter – it has provoked inflation, which is still running in excess of 3% per year.

The forex markets have taken notice of both developments, sending the Shekel down 4% since Monday. Still, it’s not clear whether the Bank of Israel has any real credibility with traders. By its own admission, its intervention program is temporary: “It is clear that we won’t carry on buying foreign currency forever. Everybody understands that the central bank can’t beat the market, but sometimes the market does things that are not justified.”

Analysts, meanwhile, insist that the Shekel’s appreciation is not unusual, and that the intervention runs counter to fundamentals. “[The] market pressures strengthening the shekel against the dollar, are, in fact, consistent with underlying economic conditions. Fundamental economic conditions favoring the revaluation of the shekel include the accumulation of a balance of payments credit of $4.3 billion over the past thee quarters.” These analysts, then, are more concerned about rising inflation then about the competitiveness of Israeli exports.

Barclays, an investment bank, evidently subscribes to this school of though, and predicts the Shekel “will increase 2% after breaching their so-called resistance levels.” Merrill Lynch, meanwhile, sees the Shekel appreciating an additional 10% over the next year.

Emerging market currencies have soared over the last few months, thanks to a commensurate recovery in investor risk appetite. This trend is on full display in Eastern Europe, where, “The Hungarian currency, which has dropped 14 percent in the past year, has been the best performer in the past three months of the 26 emerging-market units tracked Bloomberg, having advanced 10 percent.” The Polish Zloty, meanwhile, can claim the distinction of best performer against the Euro, having risen 6% in the last month alone. [The chart below, which plots both currencies against the USD, is inverted].

This marks a stunning reversal for these currencies, both of which had fallen by over 40% over the previous six months. Explains one analyst, Poland “is back in favor after Prime Minister Donald Tusk pledged to support the zloty, the International Monetary Fund provided a $20.6 billion flexible credit line and the country posted the only positive quarterly growth rate among the EU’s 10 eastern members.”

As a result, investors are now pouring money into Poland at an even faster rate than they were extracting it during the height of the credit crisis hysteria. “Foreign investors poured 2.6 billion euros ($3.7 billion) into Polish bonds and stocks in April and May,” driving share prices up and risk premiums down. Incredibly, Polish assets still remain cheap by most valuation metrics. meanwhile, its currency has yet to erase the gap with its Eastern European counterparts that was opened last fall, and “Brown Brothers Harriman recommends buying the zloty for gains of 7.4 percent by yearend to 69.3 against Hungary’s forint and of 3.4 percent to 6.33 per Czech koruna.”

Speaking of Hungary, it is projected for “Gross domestic product to drop 6.7 percent this year, the most since 1991. Hungary, along with other emerging economies across Europe, has been hurt by a collapse in demand for its exports including Nokia phones and Audi cars. ‘The Hungarian economy is unlikely to recover from the current recession much before 2011.” The Central Bank recently moved to cut interest rates by a whopping 1%, and may cut rates by a further 2.5% before the year is out. Investors, evidently, are indifferent to this prospect, and continue to push Hungarian stocks, bonds, and currency back towards the levels of the bubble years.

This disconnect between economic fundamentals and asset prices seems to be playing out throughout the EU. On one front, “Bulgaria and the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, also EU members, have had to resist pressure to devalue their currencies as eastern Europe’s recession takes its toll.” According to another source, “Nonperforming loans are rising across the EBRD countries and have doubled in the past year in Turkey, Romania, Ukraine and Albania, according to the EBRD. Recent data from national central banks show commercial banks in Romania are no longer collecting interest on more than 8% of the loans they’ve extended, and the figure is nearing 5% in Turkey, where credit cards are already defaulting at a double-digit pace.” At the same time, the Dow Jones Eastern Europe Stock Index just touched a 10-month high. Go figure.

In the last three months alone, the Brazilian Real has risen by an impressive 15% against the Dollar alone. What’s driving this impressive importance? The lead paragraph for one article offered the following encapsulation: “Brazil’s real climbed to the highest in more than nine months as stronger-than-estimated corporate earnings, rising equities and higher metal prices bolstered the outlook for Latin America’s largest economy.”

These factors certainly represent a good starting point for any analysis of the Real. As signs continue to emerge that the global economy – and China specifically – have turned a corner in their fight to overcome recession, commodities will likely continue to rally, which is excellent news for Brazil bulls. In addition, “May industrial production and especially retail sales came in stronger than expected, following incipient signs of improvement in labor and credit conditions, consumer and investor confidence, and inventory levels.” As a result, after a modest contraction in 2009 (the bulk of which took place in the first quarter), 2010 is expected to mark a return to solid growth, with estimates ranging from 3.5% to 4.5%, rising to 5% in 2011.

The Central Bank of Brazil, however, is not necessarily on the same page. Last week, it cut rates to a record low of 8.75%, in order to ensure that Brazilian monetary policy remains easy enough to support growth. While this is an unwelcome development for carry traders, there are a few mitigating circumstances. First, considering that Brazilian inflation is projected to average 4.5% in 2009, this still affords investors a solid 4% real return, without factoring in currency fluctuations. Second, Brazilian rates are still significantly higher than levels in industrialized countries, such that the interest rate differential which makes Brazil attractive has been carefully preserved. Finally, while precise forecasts vary, the Central Bank is expected to begin hiking rates as soon as the end of this year, with further hikes throughout 2010.

The Central Bank has also been busy on other fronts. Thanks to a healthy trade surplus, its foreign exchange reserves are burgeoning, recently touching a record $209 Billion. This figure well exceeds Brazil’s outstanding debt, which gives it great flexibility in determining how to allocate these reserves. Already, the Central Bank has begun to pare down its holdings of US Treasury securities, in search of higher-yielding alternatives. In addition, the Central Bank has taken to intervening regularly in the forex spot market, in a vain effort to stem the rise of the Real.

In the short term, analysts are now lining up around various technical levels, backed by little real fundamental analysis. “Moreover, without fundamental economic news showing better times ahead for the U.S. economy, principally, then the BRL1.90 support will remain cemented in place,” offered one analyst. “You show me some more good news and the support will be closer to 1.85,” argued another. It looks like traders are just looking for excuses to keep bidding up the Real.

Since touching a low in March, the emerging market class has risen by 50%, according to one measure. This led to concerns that another bubble was forming, a swift pullback ensued. The bulls, however, point out that valuations remain well below 2007-2008 bubble levels and that according to some measures, fundamentals are actually quite strong.

They have a point. With the exception of a few bailouts in Eastern Europe, emerging markets as a whole have actually weathered the storm quite well. As one analyst points out, “Governance has improved, many countries run current-account surpluses, foreign-currency reserves have grown, the middle classes are expanding and savings rates are high. Countries such as Brazil and Turkey have been able to cut rates during the crisis and still attract money.”

In fact, it wasn’t even until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (when some might say the credit crisis entered the worst stage) that investors even began to pull money from emerging markets. “During the first half of 2008, gross capital inflows to EMEs held up remarkably well, in many cases reaching 60–70% of the record high inflows in 2007…The fact that other investors (banks and bondholders) maintained their positions in EMEs may be attributed to a number of factors…including much larger official foreign exchange reserves and more robust banking systems in many cases.”

Accordingly, it could be argued that the recent rally in emerging markets could represent a “reverse correction”- an acknowledgment that the record decline was simply an overreaction. While stocks still remain well below their record highs, bonds are rapidly approaching pre-crisis levels. The spread between the JP Morgan EMBI+ index and US Treasury securities is now approximately where it was one year ago.

The naysayers, though, like to remind people that emerging markets are inherently risky: “The past decade or so alone has seen the Asian crisis, the Russian default and another round of restructuring in Latin America. Populist politics, poor fiscal management, a reliance on foreign-currency borrowing and fixed exchange rates were a magnet for trouble.”

Sound macroeconomic and fiscal policy notwithstanding, it’s clear that certain structural problems remain extant: “In February 2009 it became clear that the state of these economies was deteriorating faster than expected. Many borrowers faced challenges repaying or rolling over their loans. The loss of investor confidence suddenly exposed long-standing vulnerabilities, such as the widespread practice of foreign currency borrowing by households and by small and medium-sized enterprises.” In addition, emerging markets collectively remain heavily reliant on exports to drive growth, which is problematic given that, “The synchronised fall in exports intensified in the first quarter of 2009 with an average year-on-year decrease of around 25% in a set of larger EMEs. In some commodity-exporting countries, notably Chile and Russia, exports fell by more than 40% in the first quarter of 2009.”

The best way to account for this schism between capital inflows and economic uncertainty is a shift in the way emerging market investors view risk. Previously, it was default risk that predominated. Now, however, it is inflation and currency risk, as well as corporate credit risk, that guides investor thinking.

Since peaking in the beginning of June, the MSCI emerging markets index has fallen nearly 10%. While this is small potatoes compared to the 60% rise that the index cranked out in the previous three months, it could signal the beginning of a “correction.”

Around the peak a couple weeks ago, the Forex Blog reported that emerging market stocks had become quite expensive, relative to historical P/E ratios. It’s hard to say whether investors were/are operating under similar assumptions when the market pulled back, or rather if they have been driven by other factors. This is because emerging market currencies, like many other asset classes, have experienced a disconnect from fundamentals of late, such that the ebb and flow of risk aversion – rather than any substantive developments – now dictates the movement of asset prices.

Analysts looking for clues into why specific currencies were rising against the Dollar ignored the fact that virtually all currencies were rising, albeit some more than others. In other words, it was a Dollar-negative story as much as it was an emerging markets story. Likewise, risky investments are losing value across the board now that risk aversion is back in fashion, not because of a perceived change in emerging markets growth potential.

Still, there is much to be nervous about. Latvia still hasn’t dealt with its currency, which some experts think needs to be devalued by as much as 50%. Turkey has yet to sign a loan agreement with the IMF. Russia’s benchmark stock index fell 20% in one day. One of the best proxies for risk levels are credit default swaps, which function like insurance on bonds. If a company/country were to default on its bonds, a holder of a credit default swap contract would be compensated by the writer of the contract. Suffice it to say that credit default swap premiums, especially on emerging market debt instruments, are once again rising, as investors become more worried about the possibility of default.

Generally, the Yen is viewed as one of the most viable currencies during periods of heightened risk aversion. So is the Dollar for that matter, but the Yen has less baggage, vis-a-vis quantitative easing, etc. Sure enough, the Yen has pulled back tightly of late, rising almost 3% in one day against the Euro alone. [In the current market environment, I think it makes more sense to compare the yen with the Euro, since the two currencies are viewed as fulfilling different purposes for currency traders. The US Dollar, in contrast, is currently being driven by some of the same themes as the Yen, which can make it difficult to use this pair to distill changes in risk appetite.]

In short, as the global economy reaches a critical phase in the recession, investors will be looking for confirmation, either that a recovery is nearby or still far away. Right now, the consensus seems to have swayed towards the “recovery is faraway” side. However, a sudden uptick in a widely-watched economic indicator could send the pendulum swinging right back in the opposite direction.

What’s wrong with a little optimism? Well, nothing, in theory. In practice, however, unbridled investor optimism usually spells disaster. Consider that emerging market stocks (based on the MSCI emerging-markets index) now trade for 15x-earnings, the highest level since December 2007. Does anyone remember what happened next? The index plummeted 22% in a matter of months.

Here are some more statistics. The MSCI index is now at an eight-month high, following a record 61% rise since February. $12 Billion have poured into emerging markets in the last four weeks alone. Consider this against the backdrop that “Earnings at companies in the MSCI emerging-markets gauge trailed analysts’ estimates by an average of 41 percent in the first quarter.”

Meanwhile, “The extra yield investors demand to own developing nations’ bonds instead of U.S. Treasuries fell…to 4.19 percentage points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI+ Index.” The index has now erased nearly all of its losses from the last year. In some ways, this is even more unbelievable than the rally in stocks, since it indicates that despite the current recession and strained finances, investors are just as willing to lend to companies in developing countries as they were prior to the downturn!

Who cares about stocks- tell me about currencies! “Unsurprisingly stock markets in Asia have been highly correlated with regional currencies over recent months, with almost all currencies in Asia registering a strong directional relationship with their respective equity markets.” The Indonesian Rupiah is up 11% this year and the Indian Rupee is now up 4%, to highlight only a couple. Only a few months ago, these currencies were tracking at double-digit percentage declines!

A culling of analysts’ soundbites reveal the usual lack of consensus. On the one hand, “The pattern signals an ‘imminent’ drop;” “Fund flows at their extremes are contrary indicators;” and “Investors are starting to doubt the sustainability of how much longer this very sharp rally can continue.” But for every bear there’s a bull: “There’s a lot of money looking for decent returns and that’s going to continue driving emerging markets.” In short, you can find literally thousands of analysts and their respective forecasts to support either hypothesis.

I would argue that the sustainability of this rally (both in stocks and in currencies) hinges on a return to GDP growth in emerging markets. [The IMF forecasts 1.6% growth in 2009 and 4% in 2010]. But given the gap between share prices and earnings, I’m frankly not convinced that investors actually care about whether the rally is supported by actual data. Instead, investors have complacently been swept up by the same herd mentality that produced the bubble of 2008, and could potentially lead to a rapid and painful collapse in what looks to be the bubble of 2009.

You may have noticed that the phrase “seven month high” appears quite frequently in recent Forex Blog posts, regardless of the currency being discussed. I offer this preface as context for Pound’s recent rally because it suggests that the factors driving the Pound are hardly unique from the factors driving other currencies. In other words, “It’s a mixture of a dollar-weakness story and a global-growth story.”

Of course, it would it be unfair to so glibly dismiss the Pound, so let’s look at the underlying picture. On the macro-level, the British economy is still anemic: “Gross domestic product dropped 1.9 percent in the latest quarter, the most since 1979, according to the Office for National Statistics. The International Monetary Fund now expects the British economy to shrink by 4.1 percent in 2009.” Without drilling too far into the data, suffice it to say that most of the indicators tell a similar story.

The only relative bright spots are the housing market and financial sector. Mortgage applications are rising, and there is evidence that housing prices are slowing in their descent, perhaps even nearing a bottom. Optimists, naturally, are arguing that this signals the entire economy is turning around. History and common sense, however, suggest that even if the most recent data is not a blip, it’s still unlikely that the UK will able to depend on the housing sector to drive future growth. Besides, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that foreign buying (due to favorable exchange rates) is propping up real estate prices, rather than a change in market fundamentals.

The stabilization of financial markets is also good for the UK, as 1/3 of its economy is connected to the financial sector. “Sterling is basically a bet on global financial well-being…Now that the banking sector has stepped away from the Armageddon scenario, the prospects for London and the U.K. economy look better.” But as with housing, it’s unlikely that the financial sector will return to the glory days, in which case the UK will have to turn elsewhere in its search for growth.

What about the Bank of England’s heralded attempt at Quantitative easing? While it’s still to early to draw conclusions, the initial data is not good. In fact, the most recent data indicates that half of the bonds that the BOE bought last month (with freshly minted cash) were from foreign buyers, which causes inflation without any of the economic benefits from an increase in the domestic flow of money. Given that S&P recently downgraded the outlook for UK credit ratings, it’s no surprise that foreigners are moving towards the exits. In short, “With underlying weakness in money and credit – plus large gilt sales by overseas investors – we doubt that quantitative easing is playing much direct role in the economy’s possible turnaround,” summarized one analyst.

If you ask me, the Pound rally is grounded in nothing other than naive technical analysis, which relies on indicators that are largely self-fulfilling. In other words, if the Pound seems like it should rise, than it probably will, simply as a result of investor perception. “Citigroup Inc. said in a report last week the pound is ‘among the most undervalued major currencies…’ Barclays Plc predicts it will rise as much as 18 percent against the dollar and 11 percent versus the euro in the coming year. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. sees a 23 percent gain versus the dollar and 15 percent advance against the euro.” Call me skeptical, but it’s hard to understand what kind of analysis underlies these predictions other than simple intuition. Sure the Pound was probably oversold, but is a 20% rise is two months really justified?

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission data indicated a slight downtick, but “big speculative players continue to hold large net short positions in the pound versus the dollar,” which suggests that the savviest investors are not yet sold on the rally. Emerging markets offer growth and higher yield. Commodity currencies, such as the  Australian and New Zealand dollars, rise in line with energy and commodity prices. Someone please tell me where the Pound fits into this?

The rally in emerging markets that has unfolded over the last couple months has been especially kind to Brazilian investments, as well as to its currency, the Real, which “has gained 26 percent since March 2, the biggest advance among the six most-traded Latin American currencies. In May, the real climbed 11.2 percent, the strongest advance since April 2003.” The currency has already touched a seven-month high, returning to a level last seen before the collapse of Lehman Brothers send a shock wave through global financial markets.

There is now a strong amount of circularity in the relationship between the Real and Brazilian stocks/bonds, such that both are strengthening simultaneously. Accordingly, foreign (institutional) investors are rushing back into Brazil almost as quickly as they left: “More than $7.7 billion of foreign money has entered the Brazilian stock market in the year through May 12.” The direct shift of funds from the US to Brazil as especially staggering: “Central bank data on Wednesday showed net inflows of U.S. dollars to Brazil totaled $2.06 billion this month through May 15.” [Granted this data is now two weeks old, but the trend remains intact].

Naturally, there are analysts (I would call them apologists) who point to positive economic developments and a resurgence in commodities as the underlying cause for the Real’s increase. In my opinion, this explanation is patently absurd, given that Brazil’s economy is forecast to shrink in 2009, along with every other economy.

The “real” reason for the Real’s performance is the country’s relatively high interest rates. The Central Bank has cut interest rates by 350 basis points this year, bringing the benchmark selic rate to 10.25%. To put things in perspective, this rate constitutes a record low for Brazil, whereas in most other economies it would be considered unfathomably high. Futures markets indicate that rates will fall further over the course of the year, the extent of which depends on how well the Brazilian economy performs in the second half. [It is forecast to grow by 3-4% in the fourth quarter]. Still, even a cut to 9% would still preserve a lofty differential between Brazil and the rest of the world.

The Bank of Brazil has repeatedly conveyed its dissatisfaction with its rising currency, even though it remains well below 2008 levels. It has purchased Dollars on the spot market every day for the last month, and is reputed to be considering a foreign exchange tax on foreign capital inflows, both to no avail. “We expect this flow of dollars to continue to go to Brazil, we expect the economy to grow. So, the probable scenario in terms of currency is that we are going to see the real gaining,” summarizes one analyst.

At this point, it seems the only thing that would dent the implicit optimism of foreign investors is another shock to global financial markets- one of similar magnitude to the Lehman bankruptcy.

According to a recent Reuters poll, investors are increasingly bullish on emerging market Asian currencies, including the Taiwan dollar, Indonesian rupiah, Singapore dollar, Malaysian ringgit, Philippine peso, South Korean won, and Indian rupee. The Thai Baht wasn’t covered by the poll, but given its strong performance over the last few months, it seems safe to include it in the bunch.

This uptick in sentiment is somewhat unspectacular, since “The Bloomberg-JPMorgan Asia Dollar Index, which tracks the 10 most-active regional currencies,” has now risen for almost three consecutive months [See chart below]. Leading the pack are the Taiwan Dollar and South Korean Won, which recently touched five-month and seven-month highs, respectively. “The Korean currency has climbed 28 percent since reaching an 11-year low of 1,597.45 in March.”

Investors are now pouring money back into Asia at rapid clip. “Asia ex-Japan received $933 million in the week ended May 20, the most among emerging-market stock funds, bringing the total this year to $6.9 billion.” Meanwhile, the “The MSCI Asia Pacific Index of regional stocks climbed 22 percent this quarter” while Chinese stocks are up 45% since the beginning of 2009.

But it’s unclear – doubtful is a better word – whether this rally is supported by economic fundamentals. One commentator summarized this contradiction as follows: “Improved sentiment has led to a massive resurgence in flows to emerging markets, irrespective of the underlying data, which remains weak. Investors are going out of dollars to riskier markets, riskier currencies.”

Let’s drill down into some of the data. Chinese exports fell 15% in April. Japan’s economy contracted 15% in the most recent quarter. Singapore’s exports are down 20% on an annualized basis. The South Korean economy is projected to shrink by 2% this year. The Central Bank of Thailand just cut its benchmark interest rate to an unbelievable 1%. The only bright spot economically is Taiwan, which is benefiting both from improved economic ties with China and a healthy current account surplus. I suppose everything is relative, as “developing Asian economies will grow 4.8 percent in 2009, even as the world economy contracts 1.3 percent” according to the International Monetary Fund.

The notion that the rally is not rooted in fundamentals is shared by the region’s Central Banks, which clearly realize that economic recovery will be much more difficult in the face of currency appreciation. One analyst argues that, “Until the signs of global economic recovery become more convincing, central banks will unlikely tolerate significant currency appreciation.” The Central Banks of South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia have already actively intervened to hold their currencies down, while Malaysia and Singapore (discussed in a Forexblog post last week) have also intervened for the sake of stability.

As a result, this rally could soon begin to lose steam. “A ‘correction’ in regional currencies is ‘appropriate’ following recent gains,” said one analyst. Another has called the rally “overdone.” Still, Central Banks and economic data pale in comparison to capital flows and risk/reward analysis. In short, these currencies (and other investments) will continue to find buyers for as long as there are those hungry for risk. Citigroup, whose “Asia-Pacific foreign-exchange volume may rise about 10 percent from the first quarter,” is bullish. A representative of the firm declared: “Fund managers are still ‘sitting on lots and lots of cash’ so the pickup in volumes will continue.”

The rally in emerging markets and accompanying revival of the carry trade can be seen clearly in the Hungarian Forint, which can now claim the distinction of being the world’s best performing currency. You’re probably scratching your head and/or rolling your eyes, but bear with me.

Beginning last July, shortly before the peak of the credit crisis, the Forint began to fall rapidly. It quickly lost more than half of its value against the Dollar, but then again so did a bunch of other currencies. The more relevant comparison is with the Euro, against which the Hungarian currency also fared quite poorly. Despite a 13% rally over the last two months, the Forint is still down 27% from its high last summer.

This is understandable, since Hungarian economic fundamenals are commensurately poor. “Household consumption is shrinking due to a drop in wages and narrower borrowing opportunities, while investments are hit by a lack of funds and a global economic downturn.” Factor in an 18.7% annualized decline in exports, and the result is a 6.4% decline in GDP for the most recent quarter.

Hungary’s economic woes have not gone unnoticed. “The International Monetary Fund, the EU and the World Bank have pledged 20 billion euros ($27 billion) of emergency loans to support Hungary, the biggest aid package for a European nation alongside Romania.” While financial markets have stabilized, credit default swap rates indicate investors are still concerned about the possibility of default. Meanwhile, Hungary has now been officially rejected (for the second time) by the European Monetary Union, such that its doubtful that Forint will ever be absorbed into the Euro.

Why, then, is the Forint rallying? The answer is simple: high interest rates. The benchmark Hungarian interest rate is a lofty 9.5%. While other Central Banks have been busy lowering rates to try to boost economic growth, “The Monetary Council of the central bank voted unanimously on April 20 to keep rates on hold at 9.50 percent.” Given the precarious financial situation, its economic policymakers are concerned that a drop in interest rates could precipitate capital flight and a currency crisis.

An exasperated Deputy Central Bank Governor explained to reporters, “As long as Hungary is considered such a vulnerable country, our interest rates cannot be lower than South Africa’s or Turkey’s; it’s not the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland you should compare us to.” She has clearly been paying monitoring the forex markets and knows that now is not the time to gamble with investors’ sudden return to Hungary.

Analysts remain divided over whether the upward trend in the Forint is sustainable. For its part, “Deutsche Bank recommends investors sell the euro against the forint on bets the rate difference will help the Hungarian currency gain 10 percent to 260 per euro in two to three months from 286.55 today.” However, it will be difficult for the economy to stage a serious economy for as long as the currency is rallying, which is why a survey of analysts revealed a median forecast of a medium-term decline in the Forint.

While the Singapore Dollar hasn’t been punished to the same extent as its counterparts, the currency was nonetheless dealt a strong blow by the credit crisis, falling 20% in a matter of months, after peaking in 2008. For its part, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)- which functions as the Central Bank- couldn’t have been happier. The currency had fallen just enough to almost completely offset its rise during the leadup to the crisis.
Now, with a global stock market rally underway and a modest economic recovery taking shape on the horizon, the Singapore Dollar has quickly erased almost half of its slide. The Central Bank naturally, is alarmed, and is threatening to intervene. While the MAS, itself, has thus far denied such a possibility, insiders suggested that “The Monetary Authority of Singapore will buy the U.S. dollar “‘f it falls below S$1.4700, around S$1.4690…’ [which] roughly equates with the strong end of the undisclosed trade-weighted band that the MAS uses to guide the Singapore currency.” Curiously enough, the Singapore Dollar beat a retreat this week, after rising all the way to $1.45.

The Singapore Dollar is generally considered a bellweather for the currencies of neighboring countries. Singapore is seen as having a model economic policy, and the Singapore Dollar is somewhat immune from the shocks that affect other currencies because its fluctuation is controlled via a loose band by the city-state’s Monetary Authority. The exchange rate is basically used in lieu of conventional monetary policy ( i.e. adjusting interest rates), although market supply/demand plays a significant role. You can think of the MAS as performing a sort of smoothing function.

In this way, the MAS is acting similarly to the Swiss National Bank, which professes to manipulate its exchange rate in order to prevent deflation- not to increase the competitiveness of exporters. According to a top MAS official, “We keep our monetary policy [based] on the medium-term inflation outlook and taking into account growth prospects. We don’t use the currency for competitiveness because it is not sustainable to align currencies just for competitiveness.” This is somewhat plausible as the MAS intervened similarly during the last downturn, in order to forestall a systemic drop in prices.

As always, the line between maintaining price stability and increasing demand is thin, since the latter is in fact used to bring about the former. This is especially true with Singapore, whose economy is largely dependent on exports to drive growth, and hence has been hit especially hard by the downturn. “In the first quarter of 2009, calculated on an annualized basis, Singapore’s economy contracted at a record rate of 11.5 percent from a year earlier, and 19.7 percent from the previous quarter.” [See Chart] As a powerful symbol of just how bad things are, the New York Times recently reported that over 700 cargo ships are docked near and around Singapore, idling as a result of slackened trade. Maybe the MAS noticed…

On Wednesday, the latest addition the Wisdom Tree family of currency ETFs officially debuted, and in its first two days of trading, the Emerging Currency Fund (CEW) returned an impressive 2.2%. It’s not worth annualizing this figure, but suffice it to say that its performance is already turning heads.

According to the prospectus, CEW “is an actively managed exchange-traded fund that seeks to provide the investor with a liquid, broad-based exposure to money market rates and currency movements within emerging market countries.” Investors will gain exposure both to the currencies themselves and to their respective short-term interest rates, via “short-term U.S. money market securities and forward currency contracts and swaps of the constituent currencies…designed to create a position economically similar to a money market security denominated in each of the selected currencies.”

Chosen from three regions (Latin America, Africa/Europe/Middle East, and Asia), the inaugural 11 currencies are as follows: Brazilian real, Chinese yuan, Chilean peso, Indian rupee, Israeli shekel, Mexican peso, Polish zloty, South African rand, South Korean won, Taiwanese dollar and Turkish new lira. According to WisdomTree, these currencies were selected not necessarily for economic reasons, but rather because of their relatively high liquidity and low correlation with each other. In addition, “The selected currencies are equally weighted in terms of dollar value at each currency assessment date and after each quarterly re-balancing,” to reflect fluctuations in exchange rates. Naturally, WisdomTree reserves the right to rejigger the portfolio in terms of constituent makeup, but this would probably only be effected to improve overall liquidity, rather to replace an under-performing currency.

The advantage of CEW lies in its automatic diversification, such that investors gain access to a variety of currencies but only have to transact in the fund itself. WisdomTree also points out that, “Emerging market currencies often move independently of domestic stock, bond and money market investments…[and] exhibit low correlations to other alternative asset classes, such as commodities and gold.” The chart below [courtesy of CEW promotional materials] makes this point indirectly, and it probably comes as a surprise that US stocks are collectively more volatile than individual emerging market currencies. “Incorporating a 10% allocation of emerging currency into balanced portfolio mixes of the domestic stocks and domestic bonds over the last ten years…raised annual returns by an average of 0.66%, while lowering overall portfolio volatility” in a hypothetical exercise.

“In terms of taxation, WisdomTree says normal capital gains rules will apply to the sales of fund shares. However, income from the portion of the fund invested in U.S. money market securities usually will be taxed as ordinary income, while the tax treatment of the local currency forward contracts could vary with the situation.” The fund’s expense ratio, meanwhile,  is .55%.

If the preceding paragraphs read like a sales pitch, I apologize, as that was not my intention. At the same time, I’m personally quite positive about CEW (as well as ETFS in general, for that matter), since it provides quick and easy exposure to a bunch of quality currencies, eliminating the need to buy them separately. Not to mention that this fund is debuting right when both the carry trade and emerging markets (and their currencies) are coming back in vogue.

I’m not sure if the timing was deliberate, but it could certainly have been worse. It’s tough to say whether the market rally of the last two months is sustainable, but if the decline in risk aversion that ignited the rally continues to obtain, it will be good for CEW.

Yesterday, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) lowered its benchmark interest rate by 100 basis points to 8.5%. Since December, the Central Bank has now cut rates by 3.5%, from a high of 12%. [As an aside, the SARB uses a repo rate to conduct policy, as opposed to a discount rate. In theory, a repo rate is slightly unique in that it reflects the rate at which the Central Bank will repurchase government securities from commercial banks. The Federal Funds Rate, in contrast, "is the interest rate at which private depository institutions (mostly banks) lend balances (federal funds) at the Federal Reserve to other depository institutions." In practice, both rates function as modulators of liquidity in the financial system.]

“The outlook for domestic economic growth remains subdued, with no indications of a quick recovery,” offered the SARB as a rationale for the rate cuts. Activity in manufacturing and mining, two of the cornerstones of the South African economy, have plummeted since the inception of the credit crisis, along with exports and retail sales. As a result, “Central bank Governor Tito Mboweni said April 7 he would ‘not be surprised‘ if the nation’s economy shrank for a second consecutive quarter in the three months through March, following a 1.8 percent contraction in the fourth quarter.” Meanwhile, South Africa’s producer price index (PPI) has declined for seven consecutive months. Coupled with a moderation in food and energy prices, inflation is no longer perceived as a serious problem.

The South African Rand actually rose on the news of the rate cut, as part of a trend that has seen the currency rise nearly 40% since touching a low of 11.7 Rand/Dollar in October. In April alone, “South Africa’s rand, the laggard of 27 major world and emerging-market currencies last year, rallied 12 percent against the dollar.” This reversal of fortune is due largely to the recovery of risk appetite and consequent return of investors to the carry trade.

South Africa is especially poised to benefit from this trend for a couple reasons. Primarily, the Rand’s advantage lies in in interest rate differentials. Even if the SARB hews to economists’ predictions and cuts its repo rate by another 100 basis points, the differential will still be tremendous, as virtually every industrialized country has lowered rates close to zero. In addition, South Africa is perceived as a relatively safe place to invest, especially relative to interest rate levels. According to one trader, “We’re seeing a re-assessment of the rand’s relative value because of the fact that South Africa’s economy and financial system are relatively more sound than is the case in many other countries.”

As Bloomberg News summarized, you can’t stand in front of a freight train: “Emerging-market stocks are poised for their best month in 20 years as evidence the global recession is easing spurs investor demand for higher-yielding assets.”

In the end, you can’t fool the markets and carry traders ignore fundamentals at their peril. The recent election of Jacob Zuma as South African Prime Minister “hardly adds to confidence in the South African economy.” In addition, South Africa continues to maintain a sizable current account imbalance, “at 7.4 percent of gross domestic product last year.” Despite declines in February and March, the deficit touched a “record 17.380 billion rand deficit in January” and the markets are “expecting large deficits to persist this year as exports come under pressure.”

The value of the Thai Baht continues to erode, and the currency has now fallen 10% in the last year. It recently touched a two-year low against the Dollar. Weighing primarily on the Baht is the global economic crisis, so it is hardly unique in this regard. “The government has forecast the economy will contract by 3% this year, which would be the first time it has shrunk in more than a decade.”

Thailand’s economy is heavily reliant on exports, a category which also includes tourism.  “The tourism council forecast revenue for the industry this year could drop 35 percent to only 350 billion baht in 2008,” and “The commerce ministry announced that Thai exports fell by 23.1 percent in March year-on-year, the fifth consecutive month of decline.” This is certainly the worst economic crisis to hit since the 1997 Southeast Asian economic crisis, but the country is in much stronger shape this time around. ” ‘Both at the national government level and in the private sector, the balance sheets are much stronger.’ ” As a result, Thailand has thus far managed to stave off a run on its currency, even despite a decline in investment- both direct and speculative. The Thai stock market is sagging; according to one commentator, “Fund flows could continue to drag the market down as we see profit-taking in this region.”

The government and the Central Bank are working in tandem to relieve the situation, but there isn’t much optimism surrounding their efforts. The Minister of Finance recently announced an (attempted) expansion of Thailand’s own version of an economic stimulus plan, to $40 Billion. Funding will be provided for “investment projects in a wide range of industries such as logistics, agriculture and energy.  The Bank of Thailand recently slashes rates to 1.25%, tying a record low that was set in 2003.

However, “The decision to cut the rate by a quarter percentage point to 1.25 percent came as more than 40,000 protesters seeking to oust the government were massed in the capital Bangkok.” The political unrest in Thailand is old news at this point. It began over a year ago when then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup. Since then, there have been an unending series of protests and counter-protests aimed at keeping him out or bringing him back. Basically, no one is happy with the current situation, but still there are no signs of political change. The Prime Minister has refused requests to resign, and Thaksin remains in exile outside the country.

The political uncertainty isn’t really weighing on the Baht, but one analyst warns this could change: “The baht is likely to underperform in the near term due to political tensions, which have prevented the government from undertaking aggressive fiscal stimulus.” In other words, while tourism has been impacted by the protests, the biggest problem is that the government is being hamstrung in its efforts to forge a strong response to the economic crisis.

Only two months ago, the Wall Street Journal published an article under the headline “Slowdown hits Emerging Markets.” Buttressed with economic data and testimony from economists, the piece underscored the notion that “The global downdraft is hitting the world’s emerging economies with a speed and ferocity few imagined possible.” On Monday, the same newspaper published an article entitled “Emerging Markets Go on a Tear,” exploring how emerging markets have outperformed in 2009.

That these stories are built around opposing themes is not surprising, but given that they were published only two months apart, it seems impossible that they could both be meaningful. A deeper analysis, however, reveals some powerful insights, namely that investors seem to be flocking back to emerging markets despite poor fundamentals.

It’s difficult to pinpoint the start of the rally, but it accelerated in earnest in early March for no apparent reason other than investors arbitrarily decided to collectively increase risk-taking. This seems like a classic case of ‘making one’s own reality,’ given that the economic picture continues to deteriorate, and “positive” developments were limited to an increase in government intervention and stimulus plans. But, perception is everything in financial markets, and if investors collectively decide they want a rally, then a rally will indeed obtain.

In the case of emerging markets, the rally has certainly surpassed all expectations. “A Morgan Stanley index tracking emerging-market stocks is up 12% in dollar terms. By contrast, its index following stocks in developed markets outside the U.S. and Canada is down 9%.” Meanwhile, “The extra yield investors demand to own developing nation debt instead of U.S. Treasuries narrowed 10 basis points, or 0.1 percentage point, to 5.68 percentage points.

Emerging market currencies have also enjoyed a nice bounce, led by an across-the-board 7% gain in the Mexican Peso, Brazilian Real, and Russian Ruble over the last five weeks. Analysts at both Citigroup and Goldman Sachs are now encouraging clients to pile back into such currencies, evidently confident that the rally is sustainable: “Valuation has become very attractive in many cases, in particular in historically higher-yielding currencies.”

The concern, however, is that this rally is a product of financial and technical factors, and is not underlied by macroeconomic fundamentals. Exports and confidence have tumbled at a record pace, such that “J.P. Morgan forecasts at least 11 emerging economies — among them South Korea, Taiwan, Russia, Turkey, and Mexico — will shrink in 2009, with another 4 posting no growth.” Instead, investors are using low prices and a lull in bad news – rather than a change in economic tenor – as a basis for buying.

Of course, the bulls will selectively point to data which paint a different picture.  “From monetary easing to joint fiscal policy to capital becoming less constrained at banks, the potential for a recovery in 2010 and 2011 seems more likely.” Some analysts have argued that they believe emerging markets have been, and will continued to be cushioned from the worst of the financial crisis due to their conservative financial sectors, but this argument strikes me as self-justification. Others point to the $500 Billion increase in capital that the IMF (via the G20) will potentially make available to developing countries. As I wrote in a recent post, however, much of the perceived increase is redundant and/or has not yet been guaranteed by rich countries.

Personally, I fall in the “cautiously pessimistic” camp, summarized as follows: “The economic picture is cloudy enough that a number of investors say it is worth adopting a more nimble approach in the short run.” In other words, a wait-and-see approach is probably more prudent than following the crowd, especially since it was the crowd that as originally responsible for the bubble.

This week, the Yen continued its decline against the Dollar and Euro, dipping well below 100 Yen/Dollar en route to a six-month low. Most analysts attribute this trend to a pickup in risk aversion: “Some kind of optimism is returning to the market and that’s putting pressure on the yen,” explained one analyst succinctly.

An ongoing rally in stocks and commodities is reinforcing investor attitudes that the economic recession is under control, and is stimulating risk-taking. In other words, the same forces that contributed to the unwinding of the carry trade during the beginning of the credit crisis, are now working in reverse and causing investors to flee from the Yen en masse. “As long as stocks can retain their buoyancy… risk appetite and risk-based trades will be in vogue and investors will continue to add to and rebuild yen short positions.”

According to the most recent International Monetary Market report, “Short positions on the currency have been building up for three consecutive weeks, and are now at levels last seen in the late summer of 2008,” which means the Yen’s slide has basically become self-fulfilling. From a technical standpoint, “A move above 101.00 yen was technically significant as it was a 38.2 percent Fibonacci retracement of its decline from a peak in 2007 to its 13-year low in January.” Even domestic Japanese investors have signaled their bearishness by taking advantage of last week’s Yen upswing by making “aggressive purchases of foreign bonds.”

From a fundamental standpoint, the decline in the Yen makes sense, given the abysmal economic situation in Japan. In fact, the “Minutes from the Bank of Japan’s March meeting showed members of the central bank were leaning toward cutting the bank’s economic forecast in April, and that they believed the BOJ would need to continue to provide substantial liquidity to financial markets that they see as still under substantial stress.”

The government is finally responding to the economic crisis, having most recently unveiled a $150 Billion plan, to supplement the $100 Billion initiative announced earlier this year. “If implemented competently, these steps could stabilize the domestic economy and stop the bleeding in labor markets.” At the same time, the intertwined tailspin in confidence and spending suggest that the government’s efforts could be in vain.

While equity investors have reacted positively – pushing the stock market into positive territory for the year- bond and currency traders are understandably concerned. Yields on Japanese bonds are already rising in anticipation of $100 Billion in bonds that the government will have to issue in 2009 alone. Naturally, the burden to purchase these bonds will fall on the Bank of Japan, which will be forced to print money and contribute to the further devaluation of the Yen in the process.

Ultimately, the duration of the Yen’s slide depends on the duration of the global stock market rally. If you believe that the global economy has turned a corner, then the Yen is done. If, on the other hand, you are inclined to side with George Soros, who opined recently that “It’s a bear-market rally because we have not yet turned the economy around,” then there is still cause for Yen bullishness.

The Korean Won is among the biggest losers of the credit crisis, excluding Iceland of course. The currency has fallen 40% against the Dollar over the last year, even adjusting for a 10% rise in the last week. South Korean Finance Minister Yoon Jeung-hyun blames currency speculators, pledging that “The government will not sit idle when the foreign exchange rate is excessively tilted toward one direction or when there are speculative forces.”

Perhaps understanding that it cannot possibly hope to defend its currency against such a broad tide of determined speculators, the Central Bank of Korea has all but given up on intervening in forex markets. “South Korea was the catalyst for the shift away from defensive intervention. After spending 22 percent of foreign reserves from August to November to stem won losses, Yoon…said Feb. 25 that its weakness may be an ‘engine for export growth.’ ”

There is some plausibility to this argument, since South Korean economic fundamentals (as bleak as they are) probably don’t support such a precipitous decline in the Won. In fact some South Korean exporters have benefited from the weak currency, with companies such as Hyundai and Samsung growing revenues and increasing market share. Still, the global recession has impelled foreign consumers to cut back on spending, with the end result that “A double-digit fall in exports in the last three months of 2008 seriously undermined industrial production, [and] a 16% plunge in facility investment was an equally important factor in the 5.6% contraction in Korea’s GDP from the previous quarter.”

Ultimately, the Won’s decline is being driven by an acute shortage of Dollars. A relatively large portion of Korean public and private debt is denominated in foreign currency. The collapse in liquidity spurred by the credit crisis and consequent decline in bank lending have made it very difficult for South Korean borrowers to procure the requisite Dollars to repay their loans, causing a large imbalance in the supply and demand for the Dollar within Korea. Even more alarming is that $150 Billion of such debt will come due in the immediate future. “The government stresses that foreign debt maturing within a year amounts to 77% of its foreign exchange holdings, meaning Korea can cover its obligations. However, no other Asian nation that investors care about has such a high ratio of short-term external debt (on a remaining maturity basis) to foreign exchange reserves.”

South Korea recently extended a swap agreement with the US, which enables it to exchange up to $30 Billion in Won for Dollars. Investors are evidently hopeful that this represents a step towards easing the Dollar shortage, as the news caused the Won to appreciate by the largest margin in months. Borrowing costs for Korean firms remain high, and the odds remain tilted against them. Unless the US financial system stabilizes and/or Korea is able to run a current account surplus (as a result of increased foreign investment), liquidity will remain a problem.

The main fly in the ointment was Mexico’s current account deficit, which ballooned from $6 billion in 1989 to $15 billion in 1991 and to more than $20 billion in 1992 and 1993. To some extent, the current account deficit was a favorable development, reflecting the capital inflow stimulated by Mexican policy reforms. However, the large size of the deficit led some observers to worry that the peso was becoming overvalued, a circumstance that could discourage exports, stimulate imports, and lead eventually to a crisis.

A sudden shift of funds out of a currency is called a speculative attack in the economics literature…Rather than waiting for the central bank’s reserves to run out through a gradual process of current account deficits, speculators who realize that a devaluation is inevitable will attack the currency through massive capital outflows as soon as they command enough resources to force a devaluation.

Growth in Poland, the biggest eastern European economy, will slow to 2 percent, the slackest pace since 2002, the European Commission forecasts. Latvia, a former Soviet republic, will contract 6.9 percent.

After nearly six months of currency depreciation, the nations of Asia have finally been spurred to action. Japan, China, and South Korea have joined together with the 10 ASEAN economies to form a $120 Billion pool of foreign exchange reserves, which contributors can tap into to protect their currencies. The goal is to prevent capital flight and currency weakness from engendering the same kind of financial crisis that only 10 years ago ravaged Asia. Fortunately, this time around, the 13 countries possess a combined $3.6 Trillion in reserves, which can be deployed in forex and securities markets in order to restore investor confidence. Ironically, the bulk of these reserves belong to China and Japan (who are also funding a large portion of the forex pool), both of whose currencies remain strong in spite of the crisis. Bloomberg News reports:

Read More: Asia Agrees on Expanded $120 Billion Currency Pool

In the last few weeks, investors have waded cautiously back into emerging markets. Spurred in part by the Obama economic stimulus plan and pending US investment in Citigroup, investors have evidently been persuaded to take on more risk. The Japanese Yen, accordingly, has already begun to beat a retreat from the highs it reached earlier this year. If this trend continues, the US Dollar could become the next “victim.” On the other side of the equation are currencies such as the South African Rand, which have benefited from a renewed interest in yield, as well as increased monetary stability driven by lower inflation. Ultimately, this movement of capital can just as easily reverse itself, which it no doubt will at the next economic hiccup. Bloomberg News reports:

Read More:  South African Rand Gains as Investors Return to Riskier Markets

The credit crisis continues to exact a devastating toll on the economies of Eastern Europe, and capital flight has caused the region’s currencies to plummet precipitously. This has prompted internal debate in countries such as Poland, Czech Republic, and Latvia – to name a few- as to whether the effects of the crisis would have been so blunt had they adopted the Euro. While certainly Euro membership would have spared them from currency instability, it would not have necessarily facilitated financial and economic stability, as Italy, Spain, and Greece have learned the hard way. Regardless of whether Eastern European countries are politically willing to commit to the Euro (itself doubtful), this debate is largely moot, since the credit crisis has all but eliminated their ability to meet the preconditions of membership in the short run. The New York Times reports:

Read More: Currency Issues Weigh on Eastern Europe

Prevailing wisdom has long held that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has helped stabilize emerging market economies by cushioning them against economic shocks. The economies of Asia, in particular, were praised by economists for responding to the 1997 Southeast Asian economic crisis by building up their reserves to guard against runs on their currencies in the future. In hindsight, however, the accumulation of reserves may have actually contributed to the current economic crisis, by facilitating the formation of massive global economic imbalances. High savings rates in Asia, for example, enabled western countries to run continuous current account deficits. Now, the chickens are coming home to roost, and developing economies are once again finding themselves vulnerable to recession, since their forex reserve policies came at the expense of developing domestic economic bases. The Times of India reports:

Re-balancing means that Asian countries must stop piling up ever-rising forex reserves (and trade surpluses). Such reserves represent excessive saving, excessive exports and insufficient imports.

Read More: High forex reserves can worsen recession

Most of the speculation in recent weeks concerning forex intervention has focused on Japan and Russia. The Central Bank of Mexico, meanwhile, has slipped quietly into forex markets to protect its battered Peso, which has fallen over 30% over the last six months. It's unclear whether Mexico's efforts, combined with support from the US, will be enough to stem further decline, considering that economic fundamentals continue to deteriorate. At the very least, the move serves as a symbolic warning to market bears, that the Central Bank is monitoring the situation, and is prepared to defend its currency accordingly. Mexico could also serve as a case study for other emerging market economies, most of which have witnessed minor runs on their currencies since the inception of the credit crisis. At the same time, it would be a mistake for them to assume that they could protect their currencies at fixed exchange rates, given Russia's recent failure to achieve such a result. Bloomberg News reports:

Russia “bungled by trying to draw a line in the sand,” said [one analyst]. “Emerging market currencies won’t see any relief till crisis is past.”

Read More: Mexico’s Central Bank Intervenes to Halt Peso Slide

The Russian Ruble is sliding faster and faster, having most recently reached a pace and level not seen since 1998, when Russia famously defaulted on its debt, and the currency lost more than half of its value in under a week. The Central Bank is keen to avoid a similar catastrophe this time around which is why it has diligently controlled the Ruble's descent, rather than allow the currency to reach an equilibrium in the spot market; such would likely result in a precipitous drop and perhaps a loss of confidence in the nation's banking system. Unfortunately, given the current m.o. of consistent but gradual devaluation, foreign investors are hesitant to own the Ruble, conscious of its inevitable decline. In fact, futures prices indicate that it is due to fall another 11%, with experts suggesting that this could be implemented over a time period as brief as one month, in order to return the economy to "normal" functioning as quickly as possible. Bloomberg News reports:

The falling ruble is causing banks, companies and individuals to hoard foreign currency. "All the attention of the people is focused on the forex market. Companies aren’t buying supplies, they’re investing their rubles in dollars instead because the play is too attractive."

Read More: Ruble Drops to Pre-1998 Crisis Low on 6th Devaluation This Year

A steady decline in risk aversion has taken place over the last few months, such that investors once again appear willing to own riskier assets, especially in the developing world. If this continues, increasing demand for emerging market assets would probably be accompanied by currency appreciation. While there are several ways that investors could conceivably profit from this trend, there is an overlooked strategy: currency options. Specifically, some traders have begun to write "out of the money" put options- the equivalent of selling insurance to investors that wish to protect themselves from further declines in emerging market currencies. Those who specialize in currency options, however, have noticed declines in both implied volatility and the risk-reversal rate, which together suggest that such a possibility is now perceived as less likely. Regardless of whether you plan to employ such a strategy, it's worth paying attention to currency options prices, as they represent valuable snapshots of a given currency's perceived health. Bloomberg News reports:

Traders quote implied volatility, a measure of expected price swings, as part of setting options prices. Options are contracts granting the right to buy or sell a specific amount of a security in a given time span.

Read More: Currency Options Best Bet on Risk Aversion Drop, Barclays Says

Despite a late 2008 rally on the basis of improved risk tolerance, the prospects for emerging market currencies remain grim. The decline in commodity prices have deprived many such countries, namely Russia and Venezuela, of much-need export revenue. Moreover, the credit crisis and consequent abatement in inflation paved the way for massive interest rate cuts, which made investing in emerging market securities much less attractive. Current-account balances have turned from surplus to deficit in a matter of months, and governments have turned to foreign lenders to make up the difference. Unfortunately, confidence in such currencies is still quite low, forcing governments to issue debt denominated in USD, rather than local currency. Even despite this accommodation, investors remain hesitant. Bloomberg News reports:

Lower levels of foreign investment in these countries will make it harder for policy makers to cut current-account deficits, leaving their currencies “potential flashpoints” for losses.

Read More: Emerging Currencies to Drop, Morgan Stanley Says

The Central Bank of Vietnam finally acceded to reality and devalued its currency, the Vietnam Dong, by 3%. Prior to the change, the Dong (as well as its neighbor, the Chinese Yuan, which has also experienced a decline) was one of the few relative winners of the credit crisis. Perhaps this was because the currency had already depreciated significantly in recent years (35% since 1994), as well as because it remains fixed to the Dollar and hence it is impossible for the markets to short it when it becomes overvalued. Vietnam continues to be plagued by double-digit inflation and a surging current account imbalance, which suggest that the currency will probably have to suffer an additional 'correction' before reaching a sustainable level. In fact, the black market rate remains well below the official rate, reports Bloomberg News:

The devaluation followed five interest-rate cuts by the central bank this quarter to help bolster the economy. Policy makers last lowered the benchmark rate on Dec. 19 by the most ever this year to 8.5 percent, from 10 percent.

Read More: Vietnam Devalues Dong to Fight Slowdown, Help Exports

Yesterday, the Forex Blog reported that the Yen could soon peak as a result of renewed interest in the carry trade. On the other side of this equation are emerging market currencies, most of which offer interest rates well above their industrialized counterparts. The spread between South Africa's benchmark interest rate and the rates of Switzerland, Japan, and the US, now exceeds 10%. As a result of near-zero rates in these countries, investors have once again taken to scouring the earth for yield. Apparently, government stimulus plans and monetary incentives have restored confidence in risk-taking. South Africa is especially poised to benefit, as it is one of the world's largest producers of gold, which recently resumed its upward trend. Bloomberg News reports:

“South African interest rates are very high relative to other markets and that yield differential is underpinning the rand at a time when trading is very thin.”

Read More: Rand Rises Versus Dollar on Bets Zero Rate in U.S. Boosts Carry

The perfect economic storm continues to brew in Russia; the financial crisis is sapping demand for Russian securities, and a decline in the price of oil (as well as other commodities) has turned the balance of trade from surplus to deficit. As a result, Russian banking officials seem resigned to a depreciation in the Ruble, but are understandably averse to a sudden devaluation, which could shock the economy into complete collapse. Nonetheless, in the last week, the currency recorded record drops as the Central Bank took advantage of Dollar weakness to adjust the band in which the Ruble is permitted to fluctuate (read: decline). Given continued weakness in the price of oil, combined with a faltering economy and surging domestic unemployment, investors should continue to expect precipitous drops in the Ruble, as it sinks to a sustainable level. Bloomberg News reports:

Troika Dialog, the nation’s oldest investment bank, and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. predict the ruble will have to weaken by at least 20 percent against the basket to reignite an economy stymied by a 62 percent drop in oil prices since July.

Read More: Ruble Falls Most Against Euro Since 1999 on Double Devaluation

In a recent interview, three emerging market fund managers aired a common view: the asset class which comprises emerging markets represents a solid investment. Their reasoning is that the tremendous declines wrought in emerging market equities and currencies over the last six months were caused primarily by technical factors, rather than a substantive change in the long-term economic picture. In other words, this drop was effected by foreign investors that withdrew money en masse from emerging markets in order to meet fund redemptions and repay loans denominated in Dollars. At the same time, economic analysis, as well as common sense, dictate that an increasing portion of future global growth will be realized in the developing world. Many such countries have invested wisely in infrastructure and built up sizable foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, they are well-positioned to survive the current downturn intact. Accordingly, once investors "come to their senses" and recover their collective appetite for riskier investments, it probably won't be long before emerging market assets and currencies are bid up to pre-crisis levels. Forbes reports:

"Current valuation of emerging markets is the lowest it has been since I began investing in this asset class in 1988. Based on trailing 12-month earnings, emerging markets is trading at a price/earnings ratio of only 7.7x, and a price/book of 1.3x (with return on equity at 17%)," [observed one analyst].

Read More: Emerging Markets: What To Buy