The frequency of my reports on the Chinese Yuan is admittedly much higher than it used to be. Why? Call it disbelief. More than two months have passed since China revalued its currency, and after a rapid 1% appreciation, the RMB has actually fallen back. Today, it stands only .5% higher against the Dollar compared to June 18. On a trade-weighted basis, it is actually 2.3% lower. What is going on?!

It can foremost be attributed to a disconnect between Chinese words and Chinese action. While The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) purportedly supports a stronger, flexible Yuan (”Adopting a more flexible exchange-rate regime serves China’s long-term interests as the benefits…far exceed the cost in reorganising industries and removing outdated capacities.”), in practice, it has prevented the currency from budging. On numerous occasions since supposedly allowing the RMB to appreciate, it has intervened in the forex markets through various shadow dealers to prevent this very outcome.

In fact, China has increased its purchases of South Korean and Japanese sovereign debt, ostensibly as part of its diversification strategy, but more likely to put upward pressure on those currencies. “Data from Japan’s Ministry of Finance show that China bought a net 1.73 trillion yen ($20.3 billion) of Japanese government bonds in the first half of this year, compared with a net sale of 5.9 billion yen ($69 million) a year earlier. That strong demand has been a key factor strengthening the yen in recent weeks.” This could have broad implications, since in the last quarter, China accumulated $81 Billion in new forex reserves, and seems intent on further diversifying out of US Dollar-denominated assets.

China’s general obstinacy towards in dealing with the Yuan is baffling to market observers, especially given the trade surplus of nearly $30 Billion in June, its largest since January of 2009. In fact, China can be seen moving backwards. It recently inaugurated a pilot program that will allow exporters to hold offshore accounts of foreign currency, which might be expected to relieve some of the upward pressure on both the Yuan and on China’s foreign exchange reserves: “If you don’t force firms to surrender their foreign-exchange proceeds, then they won’t be exchanged for renminbi, which is a source of appreciation pressure.” In this way, China can both limit speculative capital inflows (even by domestic investors) and inflation.

Foreign governments, led by the US, are still threatening action. Senators and Congressmen continue to harp on the issue (it is election season, after all), and are still threatening to slap a tariff on all Chinese imports. However, their efforts are being undermined by both the Department of Treasury (which refuses to label China a “currency manipulator”) and the Department of Commerce, which recently determined that the application of a broad-based tariff on all Chinese imports would violate its mandate.

I have always been cynical about China’s forex policy, on the basis that it is self-interested and disingenuous, and I think the fact that it remains pegged to the USD confirms that sentiment. In the end, China won’t bow to international pressure. It will only allow the Yuan to appreciate after it has determined that its economy won’t be negatively impacted, and even then, the pace will be glacial.

The recovery that emerging markets (their economies and financial markets) have staged since the lows of 2008 is impressive. In most corners of the financial markets, all of the losses have been erased, and securities/currencies are trading only slightly below there pre-credit crisis levels. Even compared to twelve months ago, in 2009, the performance of emerging market currencies holds up well. In the year-to-date, however, most of these currencies have appreciated only slightly, thanks to a particularly weak month of August.

The MSCI emerging market stock index is currently down 2.5% since the start of the year. You can see from the chart above that most emerging market currencies tend to track this index pretty closely, rising and falling on the same days as the index. Interestingly, emerging market stocks appear to be much more volatile than emerging market currencies. You can also see that while the Malaysian RInggit has started to separate itself from the pack, the others have moved in lockstep with each other and are all about even for the year.

On the other hand, emerging market debt – as proxied by the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI+) has been unbelievably strong. Prior to the slight correction in the last couple weeks, the index has risen a whopping 20% over the last twelve months. On the surface, this disconnect between stocks and bonds would seem to be an anomaly, or even a contradiction. After all, if investors are only lukewarm about emerging market currencies and stocks, what reason would there be for them to get so excited about bonds.

If you drill a little deeper, however, it all starts to make sense. Due to a weak appetite for risk, 2010 has been a favorable year for bonds, at the expense of stocks. I would have assumed that poor risk appetite would also have helped G7 financial markets, at the expense of the emerging markets, but you can see from the chart below (which shows the MSCI emerging markets stock index closely tracking the S&P 500) that this simply isn’t the case. On the contrary, this same dynamic is playing out simultaneously in emerging markets. “Today, we are favoring emerging-market debt over emerging-market equities because the debt provides us with a better risk-adjusted return,” summarized one portfolio manager.

When it comes to debt, emerging markets have actually outperformed G7 debt, in spite of the current risk-averse climate. “Funds investing in emerging-market local-currency debt have attracted $16.9 billion of net inflows so far, more than triple the record annual intake of $5 billion recorded in 2007.” The logical basis for this shift is surprisingly straightforward: “When we look at government debt, we’re always comparing and contrasting the yields versus the fundamentals. I just don’t know why you would want those low yields from a Treasury bond in the developed world when you can get much higher yields — and in our estimation, an improving economic story — in Indonesia, Malaysia or Brazil.”

In other words, why would you want to earn 2.65% from a country (US) whose national debt is close to 100% of GDP, when you could earn double or triple that rate from investing in the sovereign debt of countries whose Debt-to-GDP ratios are sustainable?!  In addition, when it comes to investing in debt, the lack of volatility in emerging market currencies can bee seen as a plus, since it prevents the interest rates from becoming diluted. To be fair, fundamentals don’t represent the whole story: “After 2008, you really have to take liquidity into consideration. Emerging markets are going to be some of the first to freeze up in a crisis.”

In fact, some analysts are already starting to question whether the markets haven’t gotten ahead of themselves in this regard, and that perhaps we are due for a big correction: “Come September, when trading resumes in earnest, we’ll find out if the cozy emerging markets world we have experienced over the past few months was summer laziness or strong conviction.” With vacations ending and traders set to return to their desks, we won’t have to wait long to find out.

It sounds like a play on words, based on the Karate Kid refrain, Wax-On Wax Off, and for all I know it was. Still, I rather like this characterization – coined by a research team at HSBC – of the markets‘ current performance. Moreover, you’ll notice from the placement of that apostrophe that I’m not just talking about forex markets, but about the financial markets in general.

What we mean is that when risk appetite is high, credit markets and equities and high-yielding currencies tend to rally together. When risk appetite fades, “those assets fall and government bonds and safe-haven currencies, including the U.S. dollar, the Swiss franc and, in particular, the Japanese yen rally.” Data from Bloomberg News confirms this phenomenon: “The 120-day negative correlation between Intercontinental Exchange Inc.’s Dollar Index and the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index was at 42.4 percent today, and has been mostly above 40 percent since June 2009.”

Skeptics counter that this correlation is tautological. Anyone can point to a stock market rally and declare that “Risk is Back On.” In addition, it’s not wholly unsurprising that there are strong correlations between low-risk currencies and low-risk assets, and between high-risk currencies and high-risk assets. According to HSBC, however, this time is different.

For example, models suggest that the recent decline in volatility should have caused these relationships to break down. That they defied predictions and remained strong suggests that we have witnessed a significant paradigm shift. In the past, “Rising correlations are also tied to weak macroeconomic conditions.” At the moment, this could hardly be more true, with global economic growth flagging.

Statisticians love to teach the dictum, Correlation does not imply causation. Nonetheless, I think that in this case, I’d wager to say that the equity and credit/bond markets are driving forex, rather than the other way around. Consider as evidence that, “[Retail] Investors withdrew a staggering $33.12 billion from domestic stock market mutual funds in the first seven months of this year,” and shifted this capital into bonds. While this wouldn’t in itself be enough to drive the Dollar higher, it epitomizes the steady shifts that have been taking place in capital markets for nearly a year, broken only by the S&P/Euro rally in the spring (which now appears to have been an aberration).

In fact, these shifts are once again creating shortages of Dollars: “This week, two banks bid at the European Central Bank’s weekly dollar liquidity providing auction – the first time there have been any bids since May – suggesting that they could not raise dollars in the market.” This suggests that demand for the Dollar could continue to grow.

Some analysts have suggested that the low-yielding US Dollar is already on its way to becoming a funding currency for carry traders, but I think this is wishful thinking. The HSBC report supports this conclusion, “A weakening of the ‘risk on-risk off’ paradigm is likely only once macro conditions are improved in a sustainable way…Currency performance will likely be tied to the ebb and flow of the perception of risk for some months to come.” In short, until there is solid proof that the global economy has emerged from recession (even if ironically it is the US which is leading the pack downward), the Dollar will probably remain strong.